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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes important decisions
rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the
Review is to indicate cases of first impression and cases that significantly
affect earlier interpretations of North Dakota Law. The Review was writ-
ten by Kristi M. Adams, MaryAnn Leavitt, and Jennifer L. Thompson as
a special project for the NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE-CHILD ABUSE
RABOIN v. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
In Raboin v. North Dakota Department of Human Services, ' Jim
and Kim Raboin appealed from a district court judgment affirming a
Department of Human Services finding of probable cause to indicate
child abuse by the Raboins in disciplining their six children. 2 The North
Dakota Supreme Court concluded that there was a statutory right to
appeal to the courts from the department's findings.3 The court also
concluded that the department's finding of probable cause was not sup-
ported by a preponderance of the evidence and reversed and remanded
the case to the district court with an order to vacate the probable cause
finding .4
The Raboins were married and lived with their six children, all of
which were under the age of eleven at the time of the proceeding. 5 As a
last resort in disciplining their children, the Raboins used corporal
punishment in the form of spanking the children on the buttocks with a
plastic spoon or a leather belt. 6 The number of "whacks" was predeter-
mined according to the seriousness of the misconduct.7 Cass County
Social Services received a report that the Raboins were striking their
children with objects as a form of discipline. 8 In accordance with section
50-25.1-05 of the North Dakota Century Code, the Department of
Human Services (Department) investigated the allegation and issued a
written report concluding that there was probable cause to believe child
abuse had occurred. 9 The case was referred by social services to the
state's attorney, who concluded there was no basis to bring charges or
begin legal proceedings.lO The Raboins requested a review by the
Department 1l and after a formal administrative hearing, the hearing
officer recommended the determination of probable cause of child
abuse be reversed and the reversal noted in the Department's child abuse
information index.12 The recommendation was rejected by the Depart-
ment director and the Raboins appealed to the district court, which
upheld the Department's finding of probable cause. 13 The Raboins then
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.14
1. 552 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1996).





7. Id. at 331.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-25.1-05.2, -05.4 (Supp. 1997).
10. Raboin, 552 N.W.2d at 331.
11. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.4 (Supp. 1997); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-03-18-02 (1997).
12. Raboin, 552 N.W.2d at 331.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court's first consideration was whether
there was a right to appeal a decision of the Department of Human
Services to the courts. 15 The court, in its reading of section 50-25.1-
05.4 and its legislative history, concluded that the legislature's intent was
to provide only an internal administrative review of probable cause
determinations by the Department. 16 However, the court found the deci-
sion was appealable under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act.17
In doing so, the court had to determine whether the Department's find-
ing of probable cause was a final order. 18 The North Dakota legislature
created a process by which persons interested in providing child care
could be voluntarily listed in a "carecheck registry" showing they have
no criminal record or past history of child abuse.19 The court noted that
there is no appeal process or other recourse provided by that statute for
persons denied placement in the registry.20 As a result, the court noted
that "the probable cause determination precludes persons from being
listed in the registry and potentially jeopardizes their ability to secure
and retain clientele for daycare services or to secure employment in
child care." 21 The court concluded that the consequences of a probable
cause finding affects the legal rights or interests of the person against
whom the finding is directed and therefore constitutes an appealable
final order under chapter 28-32 of the North Dakota Century Code.22
Once a right of appeal was established, the court looked to the
Raboin's assertion that the probable cause determination of the Depart-
ment was not supported by the evidence and was not in accordance with
the law. 23 The court noted that when an administrative agency decision
is appealed, the court reviews the decision of the agency, not the district
court. 24 In rejecting the Department's suggestion that the court decides
only if "the department could reasonably have found its employee did
not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably," the court stated that
its review is de novo and constitutes a determination of "whether the
agency's findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the
evidence, its conclusions of law are supported by its findings of fact, and
its decision is in accordance with the law." 25 The Department based its
15. Id.
16. Id. at 331-32.
17. Id. at 332; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-15 (Supp. 1997) (authorizing appeals from
"final orders" of administrative agencies).
18. Raboin, 552 N.W.2d at 332.
19. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-11.1-06.2 (1995)).





25. Id. (citing Southeast Human Serv. Ctr. v. Eiseman, 525 N.W.2d 664, 669 (N.D. 1994)).
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findings of probable cause to indicate child abuse upon the interview of
two of the Raboin's children; one age ten, who stated that he had been
swatted "five years ago" for swearing and had a "black and blue mark
for a couple minutes," and the other, age nine, who said he had been
spanked for kicking his little sister and had bruises, but was not able to
describe them. 26 The court, in light of this evidence and the statutory
definitions of the terms "abused child"27 and "harm," 28 concluded
there was no evidence from which to conclude the Raboins had commit-
ted child abuse and that the spankings "fall far short of the statutory
definition of child abuse." 29
In finding that the Raboins' actions did not constitute child abuse,
the court stated that it need not address the Raboins' assertion that their
methods of discipline were based on the practice of their religious
beliefs. 30 Justice Neumann joined the majority opinion by saying that it
properly applied the statutory definitions of "child abuse" and
"harm," but also stated that he believes corporal punishment is "a
practice to be avoided" because it "can only diminish a child's sense of
self-worth, and thereby unnecessarily limit the resources that child can
bring to life's battles." 31
CIVIL PROCEDURE-JOINDER OF PARTIES
BELDEN v. HAMBLETON
In Belden v. Hambleton32 the North Dakota Future Fund (the Fund)
and Safe Corporation International, Inc. (SCI) entered into a loan
agreement on September 10, 1992, whereby the Fund received a security
interest in SCI's accounts receivable, inventory, machinery, and
equipment. 33 On February 14, 1995, SCI transferred property to the
Fund under a bill of sale and on June 8, 1995, after SCI failed to make
26. Id. at 334.
27. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-02(2) (Supp. 1997) (defining "abused child" as "an indi-
vidual under the age of eighteen years who is suffering from serious physical harm or traumatic abuse
caused by other than accidental means by a person responsible for the child's welfare, or who is
suffering from or was subjected to any act involving that individual in violation of sections 12.1-20-01
through 12.1-20-08").
28. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-02(5) (Supp. 1997) (defining "harm" as "negative changes
in a child's health which occur when a person responsible for the child's welfare: (a) Inflicts, or
allows to be inflicted, upon the child, physical or mental injury, including injuries sustained as a result
of excessive corporal punishment").
29. Raboin, 552 N.W.2d at 334-35; see also N.D.CENr. CODE § 12.1-05-05(1) (Supp. 1997) (pro-
viding in part that "a parent . . . may use reasonable force upon the minor for the purpose of
safeguarding or promoting his welfare, including prevention and punishment of his misconduct, and
the maintenance of proper discipline").
30. Raboin, 552 N.W.2d at 335.
31. Id.
32. 554 N.W.2d 458 (N.D. 1996).
33. Belden v. Hambleton, 554 N.W.2d 458, 459 (N.D. 1996).
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payments, the Fund held a liquidation sale of the property. 34 At the
same time, employees of SCI brought an action against SCI for unpaid
wages. 35 The action was removed from small claims court to district
court. 36 The district court, on its own motion and pursuant to Rule 19 of
the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, 37 joined the Fund as a party
defendant to the action for unpaid wages and ordered the Fund to
deposit the money from the liquidation sale with the court. 38 The Fund
appealed the joinder and moved for a stay of the deposit of the money
with the court pending appeal. 39 "The stay was denied on grounds the
deposit order was not a final order."40
The Fund asserted that a secured creditor has no obligation to
satisfy the unsecured wage claims of former employees. 4 1 The North
Dakota Supreme Court noted this was an interlocutory order which is
usually not appealable, but stated that some orders are appealable even
though they are not final, provided they fall within the list of appealable
orders codified in the North Dakota Century Code.42 The Fund, citing
Wosepka v. Dukart, 43 argued that the joinder was appealable as an order
involving the merits of the action.44 The court distinguished Wosepka,
which involved joinder by the defendant of another defendant, forcing
the plaintiff to proceed against a defendant the plaintiff did not want to
sue.4 5 The plaintiff in Wosepka appealed the joinder. 46 The court, in
distinguishing Wosepka, noted that the employees in the case at hand
had not appealed the joinder.47 The court stated further that restricting
interlocutory appeals was supported by sound reasoning because it is
premature to review an order before a final judgment has been entered
by the district court and concluded that this situation was one that falls
under the general rule that an order joining parties is not an appealable
order.48
In the alternative, the Fund requested that the North Dakota
Supreme Court supervise the case during oral argument, as provided by
Article VI, section 2 of the North Dakota Constitution for extraordinary
34. Id. at 459.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. N.D. R. C v. P. 19.




42. Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-27-02 (1995).
43. 160 N.W.2d 217, 218 (N.D. 1968).
44. Belden, 554 N.W.2d at 460.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 461.
48. Id. at 460-61.
1997]
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cases to prevent injustice where no other remedy is available. 49 The
court found that supervision was appropriate because the district court
overstepped the bounds of its role as an impartial adjudicator when it
joined the Fund on its own motion. 50 Because there were no pleadings
filed concerning the joinder, the Fund could not ask for a judgment on
the pleadings, move for summary judgment, or argue the joinder as a
frivolous action, ultimately leaving the Fund without recourse to test the
legality of the claim before the matter went to trial. 51
The court stated that before a person can be joined as a party in an
action, there must be a showing that in the person's absence, complete
relief cannot be accorded the parties already involved. 52 In this case, the
court concluded, the Fund was not a party "needed for just adjudi-
cation" of the employees' claim and therefore, there was no legal basis
to make the Fund liable to the unpaid employees. 53 The court directed
the district court to dismiss the Fund as a defendant and return the sale
proceeds to the Fund 54
CRIMINAL LAW-DISCOVERY
STATE V. HANSON
In State v. Hanson,55 the State appealed a district court order declar-
ing a statute granting the prosecutor reciprocal discovery in criminal
cases unconstitutional and limiting discovery in its prosecution of Dale
Clayton Hanson. 56 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.57
Dale Hanson was charged with driving an automobile while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. 58 Hanson's lawyer, under Rule Six-
teen of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, requested discov-
ery of documents, tangible objects, reports of examinations and tests, 59
and the names of prosecution witnesses and their statements. 60 After
49. Id. at 461; see also N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
50. Belden, 554 N.W.2d at 461.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting N.D. R. Civ. P. 19).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 558 N.W.2d 611 (N.D. 1996).
56. State v. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d 611 (N.D. 1996).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(C) and (D)).
60. Id. (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 16(0(1)).
550 [VOL. 73:545
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observing Hanson's discovery request, the State, under Rule Sixteen
6'
and North Dakota Century Code section 29-01-32,62 requested from
Hanson the names and addresses of persons Hanson intended to call as
witnesses, their statements or reports, the results of examinations, tests,
experiments, or comparisons, and any real evidence Hanson intended to
offer at trial.63
Hanson moved for an order limiting disclosure to that required by
Rule Sixteen, asserting that under the state statute he had no duty to
disclose the information sought by the State. 64 The trial court found the
statute unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine 65 and
the North Dakota Constitution. 66 The trial court ordered that Hanson
need only comply with the State's discovery request to the extent Rule
Sixteen mandated such disclosure. 67 The State appealed. 68
The supreme court explained that while no general right of appeal
exists unless provided for by statute,69 a district court decision holding a
61. Id. Rule 16(a)(l)(C) and (D) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure addresses the
prosecution's disclosure of documents, tangible objects, physical or mental examinations, and results
or reports of scientific tests or experiments. Id. at 612. Rule 16(f) requires the prosecution, upon
receipt of a written defense request, to disclose the names, addresses, any statements of prosecution
witnesses the prosecutor intends to call in presenting the case in chief, statements of codefendants, and
statements of other persons. Id. at 613. After the prosecution's compliance with the defense request
for discovery under Rule 16(a) (1) (C) or (D), Rule 16 (b), "imposes a narrower disclosure duty upon
defendants than" that contained in N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-32 (1995) (repealed 1997). Id. at 612.
Rule 16 does not require the defense to make similar disclosures. Id. at 613.
62. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-32 (1995) (repealed 1997)). Section 29-01-32 states in
pertinent part:
Upon the prosecuting attorney's compliance with a written request of the defendant for
disclosure under subparagraph C or D of paragraph 1 of subdivision a of rule 16 or
subdivision f of rule 16 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant,
upon written request by the prosecuting attorney, shall reciprocate in kind and disclose to
the prosecuting attorney:
a. The names and addresses of persons, other than the defendant, the
defendant's attorney intends to call as witnesses at trial, together with any
relevant written or recorded statements of those persons, or reports of the
statements of those persons, including any reports or statements of experts
made in connection with the case, and including the results of physical or
mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons that the
defendant intends to offer in evidence at the trial.
b. Any real evidence that the defendant intends to offer in evidence at the
trial.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-32 (1995) (repealed 1997).
63. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 612.
64. Id. at 611.
65. Id. at 611 n.l (citing State ex rel. Spaeth v. Meiers, 403 N.W.2d 392, 394 (N.D. 1987), where
the court stated, "[T]he creation of the three branches of government by our constitution operates as
an apportionment of the different classes of power whereby there is an implied exclusion of each
branch from the exercise of the functions of the others").
66. Id. at 611-612 (citing N.D. CONST. art IV, § 3).
67. Id. at 612.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 612 (citing City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530, 535 (N.D. 1970)).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
statute unconstitutional is appealable. 70 The court further explained that
whereas the statute required a defendant who received information from
the prosecuting attorney to reciprocate by disclosing to the prosecutor
the names and addresses of persons the defendant intended to call as
witnesses at trial and any statement or reports of those people, Rule
Sixteen did not. 71 Therefore the statute was in direct conflict with Rule
Sixteen, which required only limited pretrial disclosure of information,
while allowing additional disclosure by order or agreement. 72 Procedur-
al rules adopted by the supreme court must prevail in a conflict with a
statutory procedural rule.73 Consequently, the court held the statute
invalid to the extent that it required pretrial disclosure by a defendant of
the names and addresses of persons the defendant intended to call as




In State v. Huber, 75 the defendant, Benjamin Huber, appealed a jury
conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), claiming the
district court erred in allowing the State to amend the jury instructions to
include "actual physical control" (APC).7 6 The North Dakota Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the district
court failed to properly distinguish between APC and DUI in its jury
instruction and that the district court's failure to amend the jury verdict
forms violated Huber's right to due process. 77
On August 4, 1995, a Mercer County deputy sheriff received a
report of a suspicious vehicle on County Road 21.78 The officer
responded to the report, and when he arrived at the location, he observed
a person standing outside of a black pickup which was off to the side of
the road, and two persons inside the pickup-one behind the wheel and
the other in the passenger's seat.79 The person standing outside of the
70. Id. There was no statute permitting the State's appeal. Id. Four out of the five North Dakota
supreme court justices must agree before a statute enacted by the legislature may be declared
unconstitutional. Id. (citing N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4; Materi, 177 N.W.2d at 537).
71. Id. at 615.
72. Id. at 613. See id. at 615 n.5 (noting that Rule 16 of North Dakota's Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure is not intended to limit a trial court's "discretion to order broader discovery in appropriate
cases," or to discourage or stop the parties from offering to disclose other matters).
73. Id. at 615 (citing N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3).
74. Id.
75. 555 N.W.2d 791 (N.D. 1996).
76. State v. Huber, 555 N.W.2d 791, 792 (N.D. 1996).
77. Id. at 797-98.
78. Id. at 793.
79. Id.
552 [VOL. 73:545
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
pickup and the person behind the wheel were arguing.80 After the
officer observed the vehicle move forward, he approached the running
vehicle and identified the person behind the wheel as the defendant,
Benjamin Huber. 81 The officer asked Huber to perform several field
sobriety tests and thereafter arrested Huber for driving under the
influence. 82
The morning of the trial, the State moved to amend the jury instruc-
tion on the "essential elements of the offense" to include the phrase
"or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle." 83 Huber object-
ed, but the district court amended the instruction and instructed the jury
that "[tihe prosecution satisfies its burden of proof only if the evidence
shows beyond a reasonable doubt ...Huber[ ] did operate or was in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle .. ."84 Although the jury
instruction was amended, the court did not amend the verdict forms to
include a guilty verdict for APC.85 Consequently, the jury found Huber
guilty of DUI.86
On appeal, Huber claimed that the jury instruction was reversible
error because DUI and APC are two distinct offenses since it is possible
to commit APC without committing the offense of DUI.87 The State,
however, argued that the instruction was not reversible error because it
did not add a new or different offense to the information since APC and
DUI are found in the same statute. 88 In support of its argument, the
State asserted that "drive," defined as "drive, operate, or being in
physical control of a motor vehicle" under section 39-06.2-02(10),
should apply to the DUI and APC statute as well. 89 Thus, because
"physical control" constitutes "driving," APC and DUI would be the
same offense. 90
The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the State's argument,
finding that although DUI and APC are found in the same statute, they
are distinguishable because driving is an element required of DUI, but
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. At trial, there was a dispute over who was the driver of the vehicle. Id. at 796. The two
other persons present said that Huber was not the driver of the pickup, but rather, he had just slid into
the driver seat after the driver got out of the vehicle. Id. However, there is no dispute that Huber was
behind the wheel with the engine running when the officer approached the vehicle. Id.




86. Id. at 792.
87. Id. at 793.
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not of APC.91 Therefore, because DUI and APC are two distinct
offenses, 9 2 "drive" cannot mean "physical control." 9 3
In the alternative, the State also argued that APC was a lesser
included offense of DUI.94 A lesser offense can only be committed if,
"in order to commit the greater offense, it is necessary to commit the
lesser."9 5 The supreme court, agreeing with the State, found that APC is
a lesser included offense of DUI because although "it is possible to be
in actual physical control without driving, it is not possible to drive
without being in actual physical control." 96 Thus, a person driving a
motor vehicle is also in actual physical control of the vehicle. 9 7
The court further determined that the instruction on the lesser
included offense was appropriate because the evidence of Huber sitting
behind the wheel while the vehicle was running would have allowed the
jury to find Huber guilty of the lesser offense of APC.98 The court,
however, concluded that the district court erred because it did not amend
the verdict forms to allow for an APC conviction. 9 9 The court reasoned
that under the amended instruction, the jury could have found the
elements required of APC and convicted Huber of DUI even if he was
not guilty of DUI because the instruction allowed the jury to find Huber
guilty of DUI if he had either "operated" or been in "actual physical
control" of the vehicle. 100 Accordingly, the court found that because
the instruction allowed Huber to be convicted of a greater offense and
therefore subjected him to the consequences of that offense101 when at
the time he may only have committed a lesser offense, the instruction
was not harmless error. 102
91. Id. (citing City of Fargo v. Schwagel, 544 N.W.2d 873, 875 (N.D. 1996)).
92. Id. As further evidence that DUI and APC are different offenses, the court stated that
because of the word 'or' between DUI and APC in the statute, the legislative intent was to create two
distinct offenses. Id. (citing State v. Jacobson, 338 N.W.2d 648, 650 (N.D. 1983)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 795.
95. Id. (citing Jacobson, 338 N.W.2d at 650).
96. Id.
97. Id. The state was not required to amend the information which charged Huber with DUI
because APC is a lesser included offense of DUI and thus, Huber was put on notice of a possible APC
instruction. Id. at 796-97.
98. Id. at 796.
99. Id. at 797.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (1995) (holding that under North Dakota law,
driving under the influence offenses carry minimum mandatory sentences)).
102. Id.
[VOL. 73:545
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CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL
STATE V. GARCIA
In State v. Garcia,10 3 Barry Caesar Garcia appealed from a jury
verdict and criminal judgment finding him guilty of murder and aggra-
vated assault and sentencing him to life in prison without parole.104 The
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. 105
In a residential neighborhood in West Fargo on November 15,
1995, Garcia, a juvenile, walked up to the front passenger door of a car
where Pat and Cheryl Tendeland were in the front seat, and their friend,
Connie Guler, was in the backseat.106 Garcia fired a sawed-off shotgun
through the front passenger window, wounding Pat and killing Cheryl.l07
Garcia and three other young men who had been driving around
Fargo-Moorhead, were later arrested by police. 108
Garcia was charged in juvenile court with murder, attempted rob-
bery, aggravated assault, and street-gang crime, and was later transferred
to adult court. 109 At trial, after the State's case-in-chief, the trial court
granted the State's motion to dismiss the street-gang and attempted rob-
bery charges.llO The jury found Garcia guilty of murder and
aggravated assault, and sentenced him to life in prison without parole on
the murder conviction, and to a concurrent five years imprisonment on
the aggravated assault conviction.111 Garcia appealed. 112
At trial, the State's witness, Jaime Guerrero, who was with Garcia the
night of the murder, refused to testify. 113 The State's Attorney and
Guerrero's lawyer requested separately that during Guerrero's testimony
the court terminate expanded media coverage and partially clear the
courtroom because of Guerrero's concerns about the media and
spectators. 114 The State's Attorney also explained he had agreed to dis-
miss with prejudice the juvenile court charges against Guerrero provided
he testified truthfully in Garcia's trial. 115 Garcia's lawyer argued against
any closure of the trial.116 The State's Attorney noted for the record the
103. 561 N.W.2d 599 (N.D. 1997).









113. Id. at 602.
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State's awareness of another witness expressing a reluctance to provide
testimony, although subpoenaed, because of actual repercussions the
witness had already experienced."l 7 Ruling that the interests of justice
required suspension of the expanded media coverage order for
Guerrero, the trial court terminated television and radio feeds and
ordered only counsel, their clients, a detective, the immediate families of
Garcia and Tendeland, and a media representative be allowed in the
courtroom. 1 18 Guerrero testified in the partially closed courtroom. 119
On appeal, Garcia argued his constitutional right to a public trial
was violated when the trial court temporarily terminated expanded media
coverage and excluded the general public from the courtroom during
Guerrero's testimony.120 The supreme court stated that the standard for
closure of a trial requires the likelihood an overriding interest will be
prejudiced; narrow tailoring of the closure to protect that interest; con-
sideration of reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding; and ade-
quate findings to support the closure. 12 1 Further, a trial court's power to
exclude the public from a criminal trial may be exercised only in
extraordinary circumstances. 122
Garcia argued the trial court largely ignored the trial closure
standard in ordering the partial closure of the courtroom. 123 The court
disagreed, explaining that since the trial court permitted the immediate
family members of the Tendeland and Garcia families to remain in the
courtroom, the closure was only partial.124 While a total closure de-
mands application of the "overriding interest" requirement, a partial
closure of a court proceeding only requires a "substantial reason," a
less stringent requirement, to justify the closure. 125 Given the considera-
ble publicity surrounding the case, impact from television cameras in the
courtroom, the specter of street-gang activity dramatizing the case, the
court's awareness of possible "repercussions" experienced by another
subpoenaed witness, and the witness's reluctance to testify due to intimi-
dation caused by the media, the court found there existed a substantial
reason to partially close Garcia's trial during Guerrero's testimony.126
117. Id.
118. Id. at 603-04.
119. Id. at 604.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984)).
122. Id. at 604 (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 48).
123. Id. at 605.
124. Id. (citing State v. Sams, 802 S.W.2d 635, 639-640 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1990)).
125. Id. (citing United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1995); Woods v. Kuhlmann,
977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992); Sherlock, 962 F.2d at 1357; Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753 (9th
Cir. 1989); Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 533 (11 th Cir. 1984); Sams, 802 S.W.2d at 640)).
126. Id. at 605-06.
556 [VOL. 73:545
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Garcia also argued that the trial court's partial closure order was
overly broad in its exclusion of the media and members of the public.127
The court observed the presence in the courtroom of family members
and a media representative,1 28 stated it was Garcia's responsibility to
request that the court permit other relatives or friends to remain in the
courtroom during Guerrero's testimony, and noted that Garcia had not
done so. 129 Additionally, the court observed that the order for partial
closure was in effect only during Guerrero's testimony and concluded
the partial closure was not overly broad.1 30
The trial closure standard also requires a trial court to consider
reasonable alternatives to a partial closure even though doing so may
bring up serious confrontation problems.131 The court found the trial
record lacked substantial consideration of reasonable alternatives to
partial closure. 132 However, the court concluded that confrontation prob-
lems and reasonable alternatives were considered, with partial closure
being the only adequate solution to the problem.133
Garcia also claimed the trial court's findings were insufficient to
substantiate the partial closure order.134 However, a trial court is not
required to explain the reasoning underlying each of its findings and
need only state its findings in such manner that a reviewing court can
determine the basis for the order.135 The trial court expressly considered
Guerrero's reluctance to testify, his intimidation by the presence of the
media and spectators in the courtroom, Guerrero's youth, and informa-
tion learned from conferences between the judge, counsel, and parties. 136
Consequently, Garcia's constitutional rights to a public trial were not
violated by the temporary and partial closure ordered for Guerrero's
testimony. 137
Second, Garcia also claimed that his conviction must be reversed
because Guerrero's testimony was uncorroborated.1 38 The court dis-
agreed, explaining that a conviction based on an accomplice's testimony
requires corroboration by other evidence connecting the defendant to
the commission of the offense, and is insufficient if the evidence merely
shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.139
127. Id. at 606.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing People v. Benson, 621 N.E.2d 981, 985 (111. Ct. App. 1993)).
130. Id.
131. Id
132. Id. at 607.
133. Id.
134. Id.




139. Id. at 607-08 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-21-14 (1991)).
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The corroboration requirement is met when other material facts tend to
connect the accused with the crime. 140 The court found a number of
material facts connected Garcia with the murder, thus corroborating
Guerrero's testimony. 141
Third, Garcia asserted he was denied his right to a fair trial because
the State charged him with a street-gang crime knowing that he was not a
gang member and that the state could not support the charge with
evidence.142 The court rejected Garcia's argument, pointing out that the
street-gang statute does not require actual "membership" in a street
gang for a criminal violation 43 and that a state's attorney has broad
discretion in the charging process. 144
Fourth, Garcia claimed his sentence of life in prison without parole
was cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.145 The court rejected Garcia's argument, finding the sen-
tence within statutory range and that Garcia failed to show that the trial
court substantially relied on any impermissible sentencing factors. 146
Finally, Garcia argued his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment were violated, resulting in a sentence that was cruel and
unusual because of a "complete absence before the sentencing judge of
any information which might tend to mitigate" his sentence. 147 The
court rejected Garcia's argument explaining that the trial court did not
have a constitutional duty to affirmatively seek out mitigating circum-
stances before sentencing Garcia when Garcia himself did not offer any
evidence of mitigating circumstances. 148 Thus, the trial court's sentence
of life imprisonment without parole in absence of mitigating evidence
was not a violation of defendant's due process rights.' 49
140. Id. at 608 (citing State v. Marshall, 531 N.W.2d 284, 288 (N.D. 1995)).
141. Id.
142. id.
143. Id. Section 12.1-06.2-02 states:
Any person who commits a felony or class A misdemeanor crime of violence or crime of
pecuniary gain for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal
street gang, with the intent to promote, further, or assist in the affairs of a criminal gang,
or obtain membership into a criminal gang, is guilty of a class C felony.
N.D. CENr. CODE § 12.1-06.2-02 (Supp. 1997).
144. Garcia, 561 N.W.2d at 608 (citing Richmond v. Haney, 480 N.W.2d 751, 759 (N.D.1992);
Hennebry v. Hoy, 343 N.W.2d 87, 90-91 (N.D. 1983)).
145. Id. at 609.
146. Id. at 609-11.
147. Id. at 611.
148. Id. at 612.
149. Id.
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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
IN RE ESTATE OF Lurz
In the case of In re Estate of Lutz, 150 Lavilla Lutz appealed two
summary judgments; the first dismissing her claim for her extraordinary
services to Emanuel Lutz before his death, and the second dismissing her
petition for an elective share and exempt allowances from Emanuel's
estate. 151 Lavilla also appealed an order approving the distribution of
Emanuel's estate. 152 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case for trial of Lavilla's claims and for reconsideration of
the distribution of the estate. 153
Lavilla and Emanuel met in 1983 when she was fifty-three and
Emanuel was almost sixty.15 4 Lavilla moved into Emanuel's home in
1985.155 In 1987, after discussing marriage, Emanuel said he wanted to
devise most of his property to his children and grandchildren. 156
Emanuel told Lavilla he wanted a premarital agreement.157 Lavilla
claims Emanuel also told her that despite the premarital agreement there
would be money left to "take care of her."1 58
In May of 1987, attorney Morris Tschider prepared premarital and
testementary documents and met with Emanuel and Lavilla to discuss the
documents.159 Lavilla did not consult another attorney about her rights
or the legal effect of the documents Tschider prepared. 160 Lavilla be-
lieved Tschider was acting as counsel for both her and Emanuel.161
Tschider denies acting as her attorney and claims he told Lavilla to seek
independent counsel.1 62 In the premarital agreements Tschider pre-
pared, Emanuel and Lavilla each waived any share in the other's estate
"except as provided in their respective wills." 163
150. 563 N.W.2d 90, 92 (N.D. 1997).












163. Id. Emanuel and Lavilla each waived "all rights of [d]ower, courtesy, community property,
homestead, inheritance, succession, surviving spouse or family allowance, exempt property, claims for
support, alimony, attorneys' fees, [and] costs of property settlement." Id. Despite the waiver,
Emanuel gave Lavilla certain property in Article II of his will. Id. at 92-93.
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When Emanuel suffered heart trouble, and later cancer, he became
very weak and begged Lavilla not to move him into a nursing home. 164
Lavilla honored his request and cared for him nearly around the clock
until he died. 165 Lavilla and Emanuel had been together almost ten
years when he died on November 9, 1994.166
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that questions of
fact precluded summary judgment as to Lavilla's compensation claim
for extraordinary services. 167 Generally, when a person performs sub-
stantial services for another without express agreement for compensation,
the person is entitled to the reasonable value of those services. 168 How-
ever, when services are performed by a family member in the same
household, there is a presumption that services are gratuitous. 169 This
presumption will only be overcome when the services are extraordinary
in nature. 170 Whether or not Lavilla provided services to Emmanuel that
were so exceptional and lacking in mutuality that they implied a contract
to pay her was an issue of fact.171 The court found that Lavilla's prior
statement that she did not expect to be paid was not dispositive of
whether she should be compensated for these services, because her initial
expectation may have changed over time. 172 The court explained that
the central question was whether or not, under the facts and
circumstances of Lavilla's case, it was reasonably expected that
compensation would be paid.173 The court concluded that the presence
of a factual inquiry rendered the compensation claim unsuitable for
summary judgment.174
Lavilla argued the premarital agreements were procedurally defec-
tive because she lacked independent counsel and because Emanuel
induced her to sign it by falsely promising to take care of her "any-
way."I 75 Lavilla also argued her signature was involuntary because she
would not have signed if she understood her rights fully, and that her
understanding was necessarily dependant upon representation by an
164. Id. at 92.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 93-4.
168. Id. at 94 (citing In re Estate of Raketti, 340 N.W.2d 894, 901 (N.D. 1983)).
169. Id. (citing Raketti, 340 N.W.2d at 901). The court noted, however that "[a]ny person after
marriage has with respect to... contracts ... the same capacity and rights and is subject to the same
liabilities as before marriage, including liability to suit by his or her spouse." Id. (citing N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-07-05 (1991) and Riebe v. Riebe, 252 N.W.2d 175, 178 (N.D. 1977)).
170. Id. (citing Raketti, 340 N.W.2d at 901).
171. Id. at 94-5.
172. Id. at 95.
173. Id. at 94 (citing Raketti, 340 N.W.2d at 902).
174. Id. at 94-5.
175. Id. at 97.
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attorney.176 The court found that fact questions existed concerning
whether Tschider adequately advised Lavilla, Lavilla's need for indepen-
dent counsel before signing the premarital agreements, and the affect of
Lavilla's consent to Tschider's representation of both her and
Emanuel.177 Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment
because questions of fact existed concerning Lavilla's claim that the
premarital agreements were involuntarily signed and consequently
unenforceable. 178
Lavilla also argued that the premarital agreements were substantive-
ly unconscionable because of their "harshness and one-sidedness."1 79
Lavilla claimed that state law precluded the enforcement of a premarital
agreement that would ultimately force her to seek public assistance. 180
The court found that fact questions concerning whether enforcement of
the premarital agreement would force Lavilla to seek public assistance
precluded summary judgment on her claim that the agreements were
unconscionable.181 The court remanded for trial on the procedual and
substantive issues. 182
Lavilla also argued the trial court erred in approving the children's
proposed distribution of the estate because the will was unambiguous. 183
She argued that the trial court modified the will by finding an ambiguity
and then used extrinsic evidence to rewrite the will.184 The court agreed
that after finding an ambiguity in Emanuel's will, the trial court used the
premarital agreements as controlling extrinsic evidence of Emanuel's
intent in order to resolve the issue in favor of his children.185 Due to the
potential unenforceability of the documents after a trial on remand, the
court reversed the trial court's construction of the will and the order
176. Id.
177. Id. at 98-9.
178. Id. at 99.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 100. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06(2) (1985) which authorizes, "[i]f... a pre-
marital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support and that modification.., causes one party...
to be eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital
dissolution, a court, notwithstanding ... the agreement, may require the other party to provide support
to the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility." Id.
181. Id. at 100-01. The court noted that § 14-03.1-06(3) provides that the substantive enforce-
ability of a premarital agreement is a matter of law for the court to decide. Id. at 100 (citing § 14-03.1-
06(2)). However, the courts stated that such a conclusion necessarily turns on factual findings relating
to the finances of the aggreived party. Id. The court also referred to N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-
07(2)(a), which declares a spouse's waiver of an inheritance unenforceable when "[t]he waiver, if
given effect, would reduce the assets or income available to the surviving spouse to an amount less
than those allowed for persons eligible for ... assistance from any state or federal government or
governmental agency for which the surviving spouse must qualify on the basis of need." Id. at 100
n.5 (citing § 30.1-05-07(2)(a)).
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approving the proposed estate distribution, and remanded for interpreta-
tion of the will after the trial on the enforceability of the premarital
agreements. 186
The court further stated that even if the premarital agreements
were enforceable, Emanuel was allowed to give Lavilla more property
under a will than the minimum he consented to in the premarital
agreements.187 Further, Lavilla had not waived any gifts made by her
husband's will by signing the premarital agreements in which she waived
any share of Emanuel's estate, as the agreements excepted what was
provided in their respective wills.188
FAMILY LAW-CHILD CUSTODY-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
HEUSERS V. HEUSERS
In Huesers v. Huesers,189 Marla Huesers appealed from the trial
court's judgment granting Stuart Huesers custody of their children.190
Maria and Stuart Huesers were married in July of 1988 and had three
children.191 When the couple separated in 1994, Stuart brought an
action for bed and board.192 After a separation and reconciliation, Stuart
moved to amend the original complaint and filed for divorce. 193 At trial,
there was evidence that both parties committed acts of domestic violence
during the marriage.194 The trial court found that the eleven acts of
domestic violence were "roughly proportional" in that both parties were
equally culpable. 195 Stuart admitted to another three instances of domes-
tic violence in which he was the sole perpetrator.196 Additionally, Marla
claimed Stuart had committed other acts of domestic violence but Stuart
denied the allegations.197 The trial court granted Stuart sole custody of
the children, judging Stuart's "past and present lifestyle" more suitable
than that of Maria's.198 Marla challenged the trial court's findings of
fact, asserting it failed to properly evaluate the evidence of domestic
violence in its child custody determination. 199
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and Wife § 123 (1995); Coffman v. Adkins, 338 N.W.2d
540, 543 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983); In re Estate of Strickland, 149 N.W.2d 344, 354 (Neb. 1967)).
188. Id.
189. 560 N.W.2d 219 (N.D. 1997).
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On appeal, the court reiterated the appropriate manner of determin-
ing custody when both parents have committed domestic violence. 20 0 A
trial court must measure the extent and amount of domestic violence
inflicted by both parents. 20 1 If the amount and extent of domestic vio-
lence perpetrated by one parent is significantly greater than that commit-
ted by the other parent, the parent committing the greater acts must rebut
the statutory presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator of
domestic violence. 202 However, when the evidence shows that both
parents were equally violent, the presumption is not applied to either
party .203
The trial court found eleven incidents of domestic violence between
Stuart and Marla to be "equal in severity," and acknowledged Stuart's
admission of three occasions in which only he committed domestic
violence.2 04 Despite finding that Stuart did indeed commit more domes-
tic violence, the trial court did not apply the presumption against him.2 05
The trial court concluded that Marla provoked the three incidences of
Stuart's admitted domestic violence and that her provocation served to
mitigate Stuart's conduct.2 06 Thus, the trial court did not weigh Stuart's
three instances of "greater domestic violence" against him and awarded
him custody. 207
The supreme court reversed the trial court, saying it had used an
improper standard in measuring Stuart's acts of violence, and remanded
the case for an assessment of the domestic violence without mitigation.2 08
The court explained that while the trial court did make findings concern-
ing the domestic violence, excusing Stuart's three instances of domestic
violence was statutorily impermissible. 209 Moreover, the majority opin-
ion stated that "button pushing" is not a defense to domestic violence
200. See id. at 222.
201. Id. (citing Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 850 (N.D. 1995)).





207. Id. The trial court found that Stuart's violence in at least three instances was excusable
because Maria's actions were provocative. Id. The first incident occurred when Marla came home
from a bar and told Stuart how the men in the bar were "hitting on her." Id. at 221. Stuart got angry,
grabbed Maria by the throat, and threw her in the bedroom. Id. The second instance occurred when
when Stuart accused Maria of taking their son Charlie with her when she went skinny-dipping with
another man. Id. When Maria returned home, Stuart hit her in the face. Id. The third incident
occurred at the farm outside Garrison, North Dakota, after Maria returned from town. Id. After an
argument, Maria told Stuart she was going back to Garrison where she "was appreciated." Id. Stuart
responded by pushing her out the door. Id. Stuart admitted to all three incidents. Id. The trial court
stated, "Stuart committed domestic violence against Maria on three occasions in which she did not
commit domestic violence, after actions by Maria that would have made most reasonable persons
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and cannot weigh in the perpetrator's favor. 210 Consequently, Maria's
actions did not operate to mitigate or excuse Stuart's acts of violence.211
In a concurring opinion, Justice Maring agreed with the majority
opinion but wrote to especially emphasize that judges have a duty to
perform impartially and in an unbiased manner. 212 Stating that the trial
judge used inappropriate language in his memorandum opinion and his
findings of fact, Justice Maring found an impermissible appearance of
gender bias in the trial court's custody determination. 213 In his dissent,
Justice Sandstrom noted that under the current standard, when both
parents have engaged in domestic violence, trial courts are required to
score the violence "like a boxing match," with the children going to the
parent scoring the fewest points. 214 He argued that instead of upholding
the trial court by acting in the best interests of the children, the majority
simply told the trial court it scored the match incorrectly. 215
FAMILY LAW-CHILD CUSTODY-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
KRAFT v. KRAFT
In Kraft v. Kraft,2 16 Nancy Kraft appealed a district court's amended
divorce decree changing custody of her children to Joel Kraft.217 The
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial court so
that it could make specific findings and because the trial court did not
perform the proper legal analysis in a domestic violence case. 218
Joel and Nancy Kraft were married in 1982, and divorced in 1991,
while Joel was serving a five year prison term for drug charges. 2 19
Nancy got custody of the children by stipulation, and Joel got liberal
visitation. 220 In 1995, Joel moved to transfer custody to himself for
changed circumstances, alleging that Nancy's live-in boyfriend had a
history of abuse. 221 Nancy denied the allegations, claiming that Joel had
committed domestic violence during their marriage and should not have
210. Id. Self defense is the only permissible mitigating factor in domestic violence cases. Id.
(citing N.D. CEN'r. CODE § 14-07.1-01(2) (1991 & Supp. 1995)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 223.
213. Id. at 224.
214. Id.
215. Id. Justice Sandstrom believed that the trial court, recognizing serious problems with both
Stuart and Maria, correctly decided custody based on the best interests of the children, evaluating all
the factors of the best interests statute. Id. (citing § 14-09-06.2(1)).
216. 554 N.W.2d 657 (N.D. 1996).
217. Kraft v. Kraft, 554 N.W.2d 657, 658 (N.D. 1996).
218. Id. at 662.
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custody of the children. 222 After a hearing, the trial court awarded Joel
custody but stayed the order so as to not to disrupt the children's living
arrangement twice, in the event Nancy's appeal was successful. 223
The supreme court explained that there are two steps in reaching a
child custody determination. 224 First, the trial court must determine
whether a significant change in circumstances has occurred since the
prior custodial placement. 225 The trial court acknowledged that Joel had
made important progress in his rehabilitation toward living a drug and
violence free life. 226 In contrast, evidence showed that Nancy's live-in
boyfriend was still actively violent and had a significant problem with
alcohol. 227 Consequently, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's
finding of a significant change in circumstances. 228
Second, the trial court must determine whether the best interests of
the child require that custody be changed. 229 In reviewing the evidence
before it, the trial court found that Joel's prior acts of domestic violence
did not rise to the level of domestic violence, and did not apply the
presumption against him. 230 The supreme court disagreed, stating that
sufficient evidence existed to indicate that Joel was in fact a domestic
violence perpetrator. 231 Thus, in failing to apply the statutory presump-
tion to Joel, the trial court misapplied child custody law as it pertains to
domestic violence.232 The supreme court reversed the trial court's deci-
sion and remanded for the trial court to make specific findings on the
application of the statutory presumption against the father. 233 The court
also directed the trial court to determine whether the presumption was
rebutted by the evidence of Joel's rehabilitation, and to make specific
findings about Nancy's boyfriend's ongoing violence in the present
custodial household. 234
222. Id. at 659.
223. Id. at 662.
224. Id. at 659.
225. Id. (citing Wetch v. Wetch, 539 N.W.2d 309, 311 (N.D. 1995)).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. (citing Wenzel v. Wenzel, 469 N.W.2d 156, 157 (N.D. 1991) in which the supreme
court held that a situation in which a custodial parent resided with a companion who beat her and
caused her child to fear him was a significantly changed circumstance).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 660.
231. Id. at 660-61 (distinguishing Ryan v. Fleming, 533 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1995) where the court
found that no domestic violence occurred because the acts produced no physical injuries, were
isolated and remote in time, and could be characterized as demonstrative).
232. Id. at 661.
233. Id. at 662.
234. Id. The supreme court noted the trial court's reluctance in applying the presumption against
the father when the trial court believed it could not apply the same presumption against the live-in
boyfriend. Id. at 661.
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The court acknowledged that on its face, the statute controlling
custody placement, section 14-09-06.2, establishes an express pre-
sumption against a violent parent, but establishes only an evidentiary
factor with no presumption for a person in the home who is not a
parent. 235 Disagreeing with the trial court, the supreme court stated that
it did not believe that because the factor does not create a presumption,
third-party violence becomes only another factor that cannot be used in
overcoming the presumption. 236 While the presumption is aimed at pro-
tecting both the parent and the child, the factor makes it clear that the
child is the more important of the two aims. 237 To remedy the in-
consistency, the court stated that a trial court must measure any violence
in a child's home against the degree of any earlier violence by the
non-custodial parent. 238 Stated differently, the court must determine
whether the presumption against placing custody with a parent who has
not been violent recently, but has been violent in the past, is overcome by
evidence of current violence in the custodial parent's present house-
hold.239 In a correct analysis involving the application of the presump-
tion, a court will weigh which household delivers the greater risk of
harm, and additionally, which household best protects the child.240
FAMILY LAW-CHILD CUSTODY-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
TERNES v. TERNES
In Ternes v. Ternes, 24 1 Bergetta Ternes appealed the trial court's
judgment awarding custody of their three children to their father and her
former-spouse, Larry Ternes, claiming that the trial court erred by not
considering evidence of domestic violence. 242 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that because Bergetta
235. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-6.2(1) (1991 & Supp. 1995). The presumption is estab-
lished in § 14-09-06.2(1) 0 ) and § 14-09-09.2(!)(k) creates the factor. N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-09-
6.2(1). Factor (k) states:
k. The interaction and interrelationship, or the potential for interaction and interrelation-
ship, of the child with any person who resides in, is present, or frequents the household of
a parent and who may significantly affect the child's best interest. The court shall
consider that person's history of inflicting, or tendency to inflict, physical harm, bodily
injury, assault, or the fear of physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, on other persons.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09.2(l)(k).




240. Id. at 662.
241. 555 N.W.2d 355 (N.D. 1996).
242. Ternes v. Temes, 555 N.W.2d 355, 355 (N.D. 1996).
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failed to raise the issue of domestic violence at trial, the trial court's
award of custody to Larry Ternes was not clearly erroneous.243
Bergetta and Larry Ternes married in 1983 and had three
children. 244 During their marriage, both Bergetta and Larry had extra-
marital affairs and bouts with alcohol. 245 In September of 1994,
Bergetta asked Larry for a divorce because she was in love with another
man. 246 Four days after Bergetta asked Larry for a divorce, Larry staged
a suicide attempt in an effort to gain Bergetta's sympathy and
attention. 247 Nevertheless, a short time later, Larry, rather than Bergetta,
filed for divorce and was granted physical custody of the children
pursuant to an interim order.248 During the period of time the interim
order was in effect, the children visited Bergetta in Mandan, where she
was residing with her partner. 249 Although Larry never tried to keep the
children from seeing Bergetta, Bergetta claimed that Larry would make
negative comments about Bergetta's partner to the children. 250
During the separation, Bergetta and Larry took their oldest daughter
to Minneapolis for a medical visit.25 1 Throughout their stay in Minne-
apolis, Bergetta and Larry stayed at different hotels until the last night
when they and their daughter all stayed in the same hotel room.
252
Bergetta claimed that while they were staying in the same room together,
Larry tried to have sexual intercourse with her.2 5 3 Although Larry
denied trying to have sexual intercourse with Bergetta in their hotel
room, he did admit to leaving her at a rest area near Alexandria,
Minnesota, after they got into an argument on their way home from
Minneapolis. 254
In February of 1996, the trial court made a final judgment on the
divorce action. 255 In making the custody determination, the trial court
looked at the relevant factors under section 14-09-06.2 of the North
Dakota Century Code to determine the best interests of the children.
256
243. Id. at 359.
244. Id. at 355.
245. Id. at 355-56. However, there was no evidence of physical abuse towards each other or the
children as a result of the affairs or the alcohol abuse. Id. at 356.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. The interim order gave Bergetta visitation rights every weekend, required Bergetta to








256. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1995)).
1997]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The best interest of the child factors in section 14-09-06.2 require that a
court look at:
a. The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing
between the parents and child.
b. The capacity and disposition of the parents to give the
child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the
education of the child.
c. The disposition of the parents to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care, or other remedial care recog-
nized and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of
medical care, and other material needs.
d. The length of time the child has lived in a stable satis-
factory environment and the desirability of maintaining
continuity.
e. The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home.
f. The moral fitness of the parents.
g. The mental and physical health of the parents.
h. The home, school, and community record of the child.
i. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems
the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding,
and experience to express a preference.
j. Evidence of domestic violence.
k. The interaction and interrelationship, or the potential for
interaction and interrelationship, of the child with any
person who resides in, is present, or frequents the
household of a parent and who may significantly affect
the child's best interests. The court shall consider that
person's history of inflicting, or tendency to inflict,
physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the fear of
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, on other persons.
1. The making of false allegations not made in good faith,
by one parent against the other, of harm to a child as
defined in section 50-25.1-02.
m. Any other factors considered by the court to be relevant to
a particular child custody dispute.
The trial court first considered factors a, b, c, and g, and found that
both parents were equally able to provide for the best interests of the
children.257 Next, the trial court determined that factors i, j, k, and 1 were
not applicable factors to consider. 258 Finally, the trial court focused on
257. Id.
258. Id. at 356-57.
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factors d, e, f, h, and m, and determined that the children's best interests
would be best satisfied if they remained with their father because of the
continuity he could provide for them. 259 In addition, although the court
found the moral fitness of both parents questionable, the court deemed
Bergetta's affair more serious and thus, factor f was weighed in favor of
Larry. 260
The trial court also considered Larry's staged suicide attempt, the
negative comments he made to the children regarding Bergetta and her
partner, and his leaving Bergetta at the rest area in Minnesota, but
concluded that Larry's participation in counseling had resolved some of
his behavioral problems.261 Although the trial court considered Larry's
behavior rather insignificant, it was these actions that Bergetta claimed
constituted domestic violence on appeal. 262 Finally, the trial court deter-
mined that Larry's good performance as caretaker and his successful
counseling deemed him the appropriate child custodian. 263  Bergetta
appealed the trial court's final judgment, claiming that the trial court
erred because it failed to consider domestic violence as a factor.264
According to section 14-07.1-01(2) of the North Dakota Century
Code, domestic violence includes "physical harm, bodily injury, sexual
activity compelled by physical force, assault, or the infliction of fear of
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by
physical force, or assault, not committed in self-defense, on the
complaining family or household members." 265 Thus, on appeal the
supreme court determined whether Larry's behavior constituted domes-
tic violence as defined in section 14-07.1-01(2).266
In applying the plain language of the statute to Larry's conduct, the
court found that although his behavior was reprehensible, it was not
immediately apparent that it constituted domestic violence as defined in
259. Id. at 357.
260. Id.




265. Id. at 358 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(2) (1995)).
266. Id. In custody determinations, the trial court must consider the best interests of the child. Id.
at 357. When there is credible evidence of domestic violence, however, a rebuttable presumption
against awarding custody to the party who perpetrates domestic violence arises. Id. at 357-58 (citing
Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 161 (N.D. 1995)). In addition, although the best interest of the child
factors should be given equal consideration, when there is evidence of domestic violence, the violence
factor will predominate all other factors. Id. (citing Swanston v. Swanston, 502 N.W.2d 506, 508
(N.D. 1993) and Ryan v. Fleming, 533 N.W.2d 920, 923 (N.D. 1995)).
It is also important to note that this statute was amended during the 1997 legislative session to
provide that in order to constitute domestic violence there must be evidence of a pattern of conduct
falling within the definition of domestic violence, rather than a single incident of conduct which
constitutes domestic violence.
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the statute. 267 Additionally, the court concluded that because Bergetta
did not raise the issue of domestic violence at trial, the trial court did not
make adequate findings as to whether or not domestic violence
occurred. 268 Thus, the court was unable to determine whether the trial
court's decision was clearly erroneous. 269
Finally, the court did note, however, that even when the parties do
not raise the issue of domestic violence at trial, trial judges cannot ignore
evidence which clearly reveals domestic violence. 270 Further, the court
opined that when there is not clear evidence of domestic violence, the
party attempting to raise the presumption must do so at the trial level
rather than wait until the case is appealed. 271
FAMILY LAW-CHILD CUSTODY-REMOVAL FROM JURISDICTION
STOUT V. STOUT
In Stout v. Stout, 272 Julene Stout appealed from an order denying
her permission to move from North Dakota to Arkansas with a minor
child. 273 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
decision, reasoning that a court must apply a four-factor analysis in
determining whether a change in residence is in a child's best
interests. 274
In 1995, James and Julene Stout divorced. 275 The court awarded
primary physical custody of Tell, their minor child, to Julene, and denied
her request to move to Arkansas. 276 In March of 1996, Julene moved to
change Tell's residence to Arkansas and James resisted. 277 At the time
of her motion, Julene made $6.00 an hour with no benefits.278 She
contended her job as an office assistant was being eliminated. 279 In
planning her move, Julene secured employment in Arkansas making
$8.50 per hour with benefits. 280 She also found an apartment and
arranged day-care placement for Tell. 281 In Arkansas, Julene would be
267. Id. at 358.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 358-59.
270. Id. at 359.
271. Id.
272. 560 N.W.2d 903 (N.D. 1997).
273. Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 905 (N.D. 1997).
274. Id. at 917.
275. Id. at 905.
276. Id.
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close to her family and only two hours from James' parents. 282 Neither
Julene nor James had family in North Dakota.28 3 The trial court denied
Julene's motion.284
The trial court reasoned that because James exercised his visitation
rights, Julene's move to Arkansas would impede James' and Tell's
relationship. 28 5 The trial court also refused Julene's motion because she
was denied a request to move at the time of the divorce. 286 Finally, the
trial court held that the benefit of the $2.50 per hour wage increase did
not outweigh the benefit of sustaining the physical proximity of James
and Tell.287 The trial court also stated that no change in circumstances
warranting a change in residence had taken place.288
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the trial
court's decision was clear error based on an erroneous view of the
law. 28 9 The court stated that North Dakota policy dictates the "the best
interests of the child" be the primary consideration in determining
whether or not a custodial parent may change the residence of the
child. 290 The court noted that North Dakota's current child removal
statute states that if the noncustodial parent who has visitation rights does
not agree to the removal, the custodial parent must seek a court order.29 1
The custodial parent must then prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the move is in the best interests of the child. 292 The court
then clarified the standards that, apply to a petition for removal of a child
to another state by the custodial parent when the noncustodial parent
refuses to consent.293
The court specified that North Dakota trial courts must apply a







288. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court emphasized that motions to relocate are not motions
for change of custody. Id. at 917. Unlike a motion for change of custody, a motion to relocate does
not involve a custody decision. Id. The custody decision has been made. Id. If a noncustodial parent
brings a motion for change of custody in response to a motion to relocate, that parent must first show a
significant change in circumstances. Id. The noncustodial parent must also prove that the change
compels, in the best interests of the child, a change of custody. Id. The court stated that to the extent
the trial court applied the "change in circumstances" test to the facts in Julene's and James' case, it
misapplied the law. Id.
289. Id. at 906.
290. Id. (citing Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82, 85 (N.D. 1981)).
291. Id. at 907 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-07 (1991)).
292. Id. (citing Olson v. Olson, 361 N.W.2d 249, 252 (N.D. 1985)).
293. Id. at 912-14.
294. Id. at 913. The court stated that it does not endorse the view that a request to leave the
jurisdiction should be presumptively approved, or subscribe to a presumption against the right of a
custodial parent to remove a minor child. Id.
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advantages of the move in improving the custodial parent's and child's
quality of life must be considered.295 Second, courts must evaluate the
integrity of the custodial parent's motive for relocation and consider
whether it is to defeat or deter visitation by the noncustodial parent.2 96
Third, courts must weigh the integrity of the noncustodial parent's
motives for opposing the move. 297 Finally, courts must determine wheth-
er, given relocation, there is a realistic opportunity for visitation that pre-
serves the noncustodial parent's relationship with the child, as well as the
likelihood that each parent will comply with such a visitation. 298 The
primary concern in applying the factors is still the best interests of the
child.299
In applying the four-factor analysis to Julene's request, the court
found that Julene would gain substantial benefits by moving to Arkansas
with Tell. 300 The benefits were not merely a $2.50 hourly raise, but also
included working at a job with benefits such as health insurance, paid
vacation, sick leave, retirement, opportunity to advance, other non-
economic benefits, and a network of close family members.30 1 Second,
the court found no evidence that Julene's motives were other than to be
close to her family and pursue her career. 302 Along these lines, Julene
made living arrangements for herself and Tell, found a child-care place-
ment, and took all reasonable steps to secure a stable life for herself and
Tell. 303 Third, the court found nothing in the record indicating James'
motives were anything other than concern for his relationship with
Tell. 304 Finally, the court analyzed whether opportunities for alternative
visitation existed and the likelihood that each parent would comply with
such visitation. 305 The court found that visitation opportunities existed
and that both parties were likely to comply. 306 Finding that most of the
295. Id. The court emphasized that lower courts must not limit their analysis to the enhanced
economic opportunities of the custodial parent when considering prospective advantages. Id. at 914.
Rather, a court should assess less tangible benefits of relocation as well. Id. Less tangible benefits
cited by the court for consideration include a desire to be close to extended family, ability to pursue
educational opportunities, or seek an improved physical and emotional environment in which to raise
the minor child. Id.
296. Id. at 913.
297. Id.
298. Id. The court agreed with the opinion in D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 29 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). Id. at 914. The Donofrio court stated that a noncustodial parent's visitation
should not trump the custodial parent's desire to seek a better life where reasonable alternative
visitation is available and where the advantages of the move are substantial. Id. (citing D'Onofrio, 365
A.2d at 30).
299. Id. at 913.
300. Id. at 915-16.
301. Id. at 915.
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factors weighed in Julene's favor, the court reversed and remanded the
case to the trial court so that it could establish an appropriate visitation
schedule based on Julene's relocation. 307
In his concurrence, Justice Neumann agreed that the majority's
standard was an important step toward more uniform dispute resolu-
tion. 308 However, Justice Neumann dissented on the issue of findings,
arguing instead for remand to the trial court and reconsideration under
the more specific standard. 309 Justice Sandstrom also dissented, stating
that because the trial court applied a best interests analysis under the
existing law of the state, its decision should be affirmed.310 Justice Sand-
strom argued that the majority's ruling supplanted North Dakota case
law holding that minor children are entitled to the love and compan-
ionship of both their parents. 311 Additionally, Justice Sandstrom argued
that the majority's decision undermined the legislative intent of North
Dakota's statute governing the removal of minor children. 312 Finally,
Justice Sandstrom declared that the majority opinion contravened
established case law on child visitation and custody and stated that he
would affirm the trial court. 313
FAMILY LAW-CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
KLUCK V. KLUCK
In Kluck v. Kluck,3 14 Marcia Kluck appealed a divorce decree
placing custody of their two children with Roger Kluck, dividing marital
property, and ordering child and spousal support.3 15 Marcia suffered
from a mental illness, and in December of 1994, Roger sued for
divorce. 3 16 The trial court's interim order gave temporary custody of
the children and use of the family home to Roger. 317 When Marcia
continuously filed groundless child abuse reports against Roger during
the temporary custody period, the trial court held Marcia in contempt. 318
After trial, the court found both parties had committed domestic
violence but that Marcia's commission was substantially greater. 3 19




311. Id. (citing Gardebring v. Rizzo, 269 N.W.2d 104, 110 (N.D. 1978)).
312. Id. at 917-18 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-07 (1991)).
313. Id. at 920.
314. 561 N.W.2d 263 (N.D. 1997).




319. Id. at 265-66.
19971 573
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Applying the statutory presumption against placing custody with the
perpetrator of domestic violence, the court awarded Roger custody of the
children. 320 Marcia was granted supervised visitation. 321 The court also
divided the marital property, ordered Roger to pay spousal support, and
ordered Marcia to pay child support. 322 Marcia argued six issues on
appeal. 323
Marcia first argued that the trial court erred in allowing the testimo-
ny of the psychologist who had conducted a custody evaluation as was
required by state law. 324 Marcia contended that the psychologist was not
qualified to give an opinion on child custody because he was not
licensed in North Dakota and his education and training were in adult
clinical psychology, not child psychology. 325 The court explained that
the North Dakota Rules of Evidence 326 do not require licensure in a
particular field, only that the expert have knowledge, training, education,
and experience helpful to the trier of fact. 327 The court held that an
educated and experienced psychologist should be able to qualify as an
expert in order to testify about child custody factors. 328
The court also found that Marcia's objections to the custody report
and to the psychologist's qualifications "came too late." 329 Marcia
stipulated that the psychologist would perform the custody evaluation in
April 1995; the report was filed in June 1995; but Marcia made no
objections until trial in September 1995.330 Marcia also contended that
the psychologist was unfamiliar with the statutory factors affecting
custody determinations, had a potential conflict of interest, and was
biased against her. 331 The court held that while these aspects may have
affected the weight of the expert's opinion, they went to the expert's
credibility, not to the admissibility of the evidence. 332 The court con-
cluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
psychologist to render expert testimony on custody. 333
Second, Marcia argued the trial court erred in finding that her acts
of domestic violence were greater than those of Roger.334 The court
320. Id. at 266 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(I)0) (1991 & Supp. 1995)).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 266-73.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. (citing N.D. R. EviD. 702).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 266-67.
330. Id.
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disagreed, explaining that where credible evidence of domestic violence
exists in a child custody dispute, a statutory presumption operates against
awarding custody to the more violent parent. 335 Confronted with con-
flicting testimony on the specifics and proportionality of the violence,
the trial court found Roger more credible than Marcia, thus triggering
the presumption against her. 336 The court concluded that the trial
court's finding that Marcia's conduct was more violent than Roger's was
not clearly erroneous. 337
Third, Marcia asserted that the trial court erred in allowing her only
supervised visitation with the children338 The court explained that where
a noncustodial parent has perpetrated domestic violence, only supervised
child visitation with that parent is permissible unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that unsupervised visitation would not be detrimen-
tal to the child.3 3 9 Marcia challenged the trial court's finding that her
conduct put the children's welfare at risk by asserting that "there was no
reasonably certain expert testimony that Marcia was harmful to the
children." 340 Finding that Marcia failed to submit clear and convincing
evidence that unsupervised visitation would not endanger the well-being
of the children, the court upheld the trial court's finding that supervised
visitation was necessary.341
Finally, Marcia argued that the trial court erred by including certain
assets and debts in the marital division, erred in not valuing Roger's
ownership share in a professional engineering corporation, and erred by
inequitably distributing the property. 342 The court found the Workers'
Compensation Bureau's suspension of any future benefits for Roger,
until he incurred additional covered losses, did not warrant allocating a
debt in that amount to Roger during division of the marital estate.3 43
Roger's potential responsibility for future medical expenses or disability
was found to be speculative. 344 Thus, the court concluded that potential
future responsibility for the costs of possible changes in Roger's health,
foreshadowed by suspension of a specific amount of future benefits, did
not create present marital debt for purposes of allocating the marital
estate. 345
335. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)0) (1991 & Supp. 1995)).
336. Id. at 268.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22(3) (1991)).
340. Id.
341. Id.at 269.
342. Id. at 268-73.
343. Id. at 269-70.
344. Id. at 270.
345. Id.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Marcia argued that including a previously received lump-sum social
security disability check as a marital asset violated the anti-alienation
section of the Social Security Act. 346 Overturning the trial court, the
court held that the anti-alienation section of the Social Security Act 347
prohibits counting social security benefits previously paid to a divorcing
spouse, as well as future benefits, as marital assets in calculating a
division of the marital estate. 348
Finally, Marcia challenged the trial court's finding that there was no
value in Roger's ten percent ownership of Wold Engineering, Inc., his
employer. 349  The court addressed several issues concerning the valu-
ation of Wold Engineering. The court found the financial report repre-
senting the value of Wold Engineering and Roger's shares was not accu-
rate and did not support the trial court's decision not to value Roger's
ten percent ownership.350 Evidence showed that the use of depreciated
asset values in the financial report did not reflect the actual market value
of those assets. 351 Wold's president testified that the financial reports
contained figures that were merely "accounting practices" and that
property and equipment were significantly undervalued. 352 The court
also found the absence of accounts receivable on the financial report of
a firm with more than a million dollars in revenue to be indicative of a
valuation problem. 353 Further, Marcia argued that Roger's guaranteed
$46,000 buy-out agreement with Wold indicated substantively that the
shares did in fact have value. 354 Roger contended that a corporate buy-
out agreement did not evidence the value of a shareholder's owner-
ship. 355 The court found that since the buy-out agreement contained no
contingencies or speculative amounts, it was really an open offer to buy
back Roger's shares at a minimum of one year's salary, and as such, had
value. 356
The court concluded that because the trial court used an inaccurate
financial report to value Roger's shares in Wold, failed to include any
amount for accounts receivable, and ignored evidence of a buy-out
346. Id.
347. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1991).
348. Kluck, 561 N.W.2d at 270-71 (citing Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413
(1973)).
349. Id. at 271.
350. Id. at 272 (citing Fraase v. Fraase, 325 N.W.2d 271, 275 (N.D. 1982) (affirming a trial
court's refusal to accept a financial statement that valued assets at depreciated cost, where the
valuation was an "accounting valuation" that did not reflect the true value of the physical assets)).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. (citing Fraase, 315 N.W.2d at 275 (holding that a trial court must include accounts
receivable in valuing professional corporation)).
354. Id.
355. Id. (citing Sanford v. Sanford, 301 N.W.2d 118, 125 (N.D. 1980)).
356. Id. at 272.
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agreement that guaranteed Roger $46,000 for his company ownership, a
mistake had been made. 357 Since the trial court's error in valuation and
division of property significantly affected the equities of the property
distribution, the court remanded for redetermination. 358 Additionally, to
the extent that changes in the property distribution necessitated other
financial changes in the divorce decree, the court ordered a redetermina-
tion of child support, spousal support, transportation costs for visitation,
and attorneys fees. 359
FAMILY LAW-CHILD SUPPORT
BOTNER v. BOTNER
The case of Botner v. Botner360 involved a divorce decree in which
the parents agreed to pay the college expenses of their children. 36 1
William and Rosalie Botner were divorced in 1978.362 At the time of the
divorce they had three children, Chad, Corey, and Collin, ages twelve,
eight, and seven, respectively. 363 William and Rosalie made an agree-
ment which was incorporated into the divorce decree. 364 The agreement
stated in part that "[t]he parties, recognizing the importance of higher
learning, do hereby mutually agree to share the financial responsibility,
to the best of their ability, should any child or children of the parties
desire to actively pursue a college education." 365 In 1993, Corey
Botner, who was then a junior at the University of North Dakota, brought
an action against his father, William, to enforce the education clause of
the divorce decree. 366 William denied any obligation to pay Corey's
college expenses, claiming the education clause of the divorce decree
was unenforceable as a contract because it did not meet the statute of
frauds and was too vague. 367 He also filed a third-party complaint
against Rosalie, claiming he had paid her $25,000 in satisfaction of his
child support obligations and also asserting a claim for reimbursement
from her in the event the court ordered him to pay for Corey's college
expenses .368
357. Id. at 272-73.
358. Id. at 273.
359. Id.
360. 545 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1996).
361. Botner v. Botner, 545 N.W.2d 188, 189 (N.D. 1996).
362. Id. at 189.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. (quoting clause 12 of the divorce decree).
366. Id.
367. Id. at 189-90.
368. Id. at 189.
1997] 577
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Corey filed -a motion for summary judgment and the trial court
issued a partial summary judgment, stating that William and Rosalie were
obligated to pay, to the best of their abilities, for Corey's college
expenses. 369 The trial court, after conducting an evidentiary hearing,
awarded Corey a judgment against his father in the amount of
$28,956.83 plus costs and attorney's fees, and against his mother in the
amount of $6,167.61.370 The trial court further declared that Rosalie
had already satisfied her obligation and therefore did not have to pay the
judgment. 371 William appealed. 372
The North Dakota Supreme Court, quoting Sullivan v. Quist,37 3
stated that "a settlement agreement that is wholly incorporated into the
divorce judgment is merged into that judgment and ceases to be inde-
pendently viable or enforceable .... Once the settlement agreement is
merged into the divorce decree, it is interpreted and enforced as a final
judgment of the court, not as a separate contract between the parties." 374
The court next stated that a judgment is a question of law for the court
and therefore, de novo review applied. 375 The court concluded that the
education clause of the divorce decree was unambiguous, and aside from
the fact that the trial court improperly applied a contract analysis and
assigned an incorrect reason for its decision, the ultimate conclusion was
correct. 376
The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the evidentiary hearing
conducted by the trial court, stating that it will not overturn the trial
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. 377 The court
found that the trial court's findings of fact were supported by the evi-
dence and therefore concluded that they were not clearly erroneous. 378
William asserted on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his
request for a jury trial. 379 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that
William's argument was based on the mistaken belief that he had a
contract action and therefore concluded the trial court did not err in
denying the request for a jury trial. 380 Finally, William asserted that his
obligation to pay Corey's education expenses was satisfied by the lump





373. 506 N.W.2d 394 (N.D. 1993).
374. Botner, 545 N.W.2d at 190 (citations omitted).
375. Id.
376. Id.
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child support obligations and education expense obligations were separ-
ate and independent provisions, and concluded that the 1991 lump sum
payment to Rosalie only satisfied the child support provisions of the
divorce decree. 382 The court stated that William's argument had no
merit because in the 1991 satisfaction agreement, there was no reference
to anything other than alimony and child support payments and
therefore the obligation to pay for college expenses remained. 383 The
trial court, as part of the judgment, declared William's obligation to pay
the college expenses was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 384 Since
William had not informed the North Dakota Supreme Court of any
pending bankruptcy action, they declined review of the issue. 385
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred, but stated that had Corey's
standing to sue for enforcement of the divorce decree been challenged,
there might have been a different result in this case.386 He stated that a
divorce decree is between the parents, not the children and that the right
to enforcement of the divorce decree was Rosalie's. 387 Justice Vande-
Walle said Corey was nothing more than a third-party beneficiary to the
divorce judgment and that "third-party beneficiary" is a contract con-
cept. 388 Justice VandeWalle was concerned that the majority's opinion
would invite creditors or others who claim an interest in the divorce
decree to bring actions to enforce it.389
FAMILY LAW-CHILD SUPPORT-IMPUTING INCOME
NELSON V. NELSON
In Nelson v. Nelson,390 Jody Lynn Nelson, now known as Jody Lynn
Novak, appealed from an order of the district court decreasing the child
support payments her former husband, Keith Michael Nelson, was
required to pay. 391 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that: (1) the
underemployment support guideline promulgated by the North Dakota
Department of Human Services does not conflict with the statute author-
izing the department to set child support guidelines; 392 (2) imputing








389. Id. at 192.
390. 547 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1996).
391. Nelson v. Nelson, 547 N.W.2d 741, 743 (N.D. 1996).
392. Id. at 745.
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judicial discretion; 393 (3) a parent has a duty to support his children
beyond his personal inclinations 394 and however; (4) it was not clearly
erroneous for the district court to find that evidence presented was
insufficient to establish the prevailing wage for Keith's occupation or
that he was underemployed. 395
Jody and Keith were married in May of 1981 and had two
children. 396 They divorced in January of 1992.397 The divorce decree
granted custody of the children to Jody, ordered Keith to pay monthly
child support, and was later amended when Keith agreed to increase his
support payment to $568 monthly. 398 Prior to the divorce, Keith worked
as an installer for an overhead door company. 399 About June 1992,
Keith left his employer to work for another overhead door company.
400
In June 1993, Keith left his job, this time to start his own overhead door
business.4 01 After incurring a significant reduction in his income over
two years, in June of 1994, Keith filed bankruptcy.
4 02
In January of 1995, Keith moved to reduce his child support
obligation. 403 Jody resisted, arguing that Keith's income reduction was
self-induced and only temporary.4 04 After comparing Keith's 1994
hourly income to his 1991 hourly wage, Jody argued that Keith was
underemployed and that the court should apply the North Dakota
underemployed child support guideline.4 05 Jody asked the court, upon
modification of Keith's obligation, to impute more income to him.
406
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the
underemployment guideline did not apply because Keith was not
underemployed, but rather, self-employed. 407 The trial court further
found that the underemployment guideline was unreasonable, unneces-
sary, not required by federal law, and that a court should not impute
income unless an obligor's voluntary change of employment is not
"reasonable under all of the circumstances." 408 Additionally, even if
the underemployment guideline were applied, the trial court found that
393. Id. at 746.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 747.
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Jody failed to present sufficient evidence of the prevailing wage in the
community based on Keith's work history and qualifications. 409 Thus,
the trial court reduced Keith's child support obligation.41 0 Jody
appealed. 4 11
On appeal, Jody argued that the trial court erred in granting Keith a
modification of his child support obligation because Keith's reduction
in income was both voluntary and temporary.4 12 The North Dakota
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that a voluntary change of employ-
ment resulting in a reduction of income does not, by itself, enjoin an
obligor from seeking modification of a child support obligation.41 3 An
obligor only has to demonstrate a material change in circumstances to
seek modification of a child support order within one year after its
entry. 4 14 If the obligor properly seeks to modify the order after one
year, the trial court must modify the obligation to conform to the
amount of child support required under the child support guidelines.4 15
The court concluded that because Keith's support order was over one
year old, he was not precluded from seeking modification.4 16 Rather, he
was statutorily entitled to a periodic review of his child support
obligation and the application of the guidelines to his present income,
due to a voluntary change of employment, would reduce his support
obligation.417
Jody also urged that rather than granting Keith a permanent reduc-
tion in child support, the court should grant him a temporary delay in
making support payments. 418 The court agreed, explaining that when
the obligor is temporarily unable to pay the obligation, the better course
of action is often to defer part of the support payments, rather than
reducing the obligation. 419 However, given the length and extent of the
reduction in Keith's income, the court found the trial court was not
clearly erroneous in granting a modification of the support order instead




412. Id. at 744.
413. Id.
414. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.4(3) (1993 & Supp. 1997); Mahoney v. Mahoney,
538 N.W.2d 189, 191-92 (N.D. 1995)).
415. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.4(3) (1993 & Supp. 1997)).
416. Id.
417. Id. (citing Eklund v. Eklund, 538 N.W.2d 182, 185-186 (N.D. 1995) (stating the legislature
has authorized and directed a periodic review of all child support orders); Garbe v. Garbe, 467
N.W.2d 740, 742-43 (N.D. 1991)).
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Jody argued that the trial court erred in declaring the under-
employed child support guideline unreasonable. 42 1 The court agreed
with Jody finding the child support guideline remedy for underemploy-
ment was a reasonable exercise of the rule-making authority of the
Department of Human Services.422 Because an obligor's ability to pay is
not based exclusively on his actual income, earning capacity may be also
utilized in assessing an obligor's ability to pay child support.4 23 Further,
the amended unemployment child support guideline falls within the
scope of the statute authorizing the Department of Human Services to
establish child support guidelines.4 24 The court also found that the
Department of Human Services did not act "arbitrarily or capriciously"
in defining "community" as any place within 100 miles of the
obligor's residence.4 25
Rejecting the trial court's complaint that application of the under-
employment guideline infringes upon judicial discretion, the court stated
that imputing income to a significantly underemployed child support
obligor is a proper use of judicial discretion and does not obstruct the
administration of justice. 426 Furthermore, the court explained that an
obligor is presumed to be underemployed if the obligor is earning less
than sixty percent of the relevant prevailing wage in the community, but
the presumption is rebuttable and may be overcome by evidence.
4 27
Finally, the court stated that imputing income to an underemployed
obligor is not unjust because a parent has a duty to support his children
"to the best of his abilities, not simply to his inclinations." 428 Thus, the
parent who changes jobs or becomes self-employed, with a resulting
reduction in income, should bear the cost or his employment decision,
not the children. 429
421. Id. (referring to N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-07).
422. Id. (referring to N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-07).
423. Id. (citing Gable v. Gable, 434 N.W.2d 722, 724 (N.D. 1989); Cook v. Cook, 364 N.W.2d
74, 76 (N.D. 1985); Burrell v. Burrell, 359 N.W.2d 381, 383 (N.D. 1985); Skoglund v. Skoglund, 333
N.W.2d 795, 796 (N.D. 1983); Perry v. Perry, 382 N.W.2d 628, 629 (N.D. 1986) (holding that an
obligor who "could seek and maintain employment which would allow him to meet his obligation for
child support," could be held in contempt for failure to pay)).
424. Id. at 745 (citing Little v. Tracy, 497 N.W.2d 700, 704 (N.D. 1993); Spilovoy v. Spilovoy,
488 N.W.2d 873, 878 (N.D. 1978) ("If a minimum wage income should be imputed to a child support
obligor under these circumstances, that argument is best made to the agency promulgating the
guidelines and, if failing there, to the Legislature")).
425. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-19.1(4) (1991); Ames v. Rose Township Bd. of
Township Supervisors, 502 N.W.2d 845, 851 (N.D. 1993)).
426. Id. at 746.
427. Id. (citing N.D. R. EVID. 301 (stating that a presumption is rebuttable and may be overcome
by contrary evidence weighed by a judge); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-07(2) (stating that an
obligor is only to be presumed underemployed if he or she is earning less than sixty percent of the
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Keith argued that even if the child support underemployment guide-
line is upheld, a self-employed obligor cannot be "underemployed" for
purposes of imputing income, especially in his case, since he continually
looked for work. 430 The court disagreed stating that the child support
guideline definition of "underemployment" is based on an obligor's
earning capacity, rather than the amount of time that the obligor
works.431 However, the court did agreed with Keith that the modification
must be affirmed because the trial court found that even if the guideline
applied, that Jody failed to present sufficient evidence proving Keith
earned "significantly less than prevailing amounts earned" by similarly
situated persons.432 The court upheld the trial court's finding that
Jody's evidence was insufficient to prove Keith's underemployment. 433
The supreme court concluded that while it was clearly erroneous for
the trial court to find the underemployment child support guideline
"inappropriate and unreasonable," it was not clearly erroneous for
court to find that Jody failed to present sufficient evidence of the pre-
vailing wage in the community. 434 Consequently, even under the under-
employment child support guideline, the trial court properly refused to
impute income to Keith. 435
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred in the result, but noted that
under the guidelines, an obligor with a job that pays more than the
prevailing wage in the community may leave that job for one that pays
less, without consequence, so long as the job the obligor takes is at the
prevailing community wage. 436 Chief Justice VandeWalle also noted of
Keith's underemployment that the child unjustly pays for the parent's
choices when, because of the modification, the obligor's child support
payments are reduced.
FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE-PROPERTY
RIDLEY v. METROPOLITAN FEDERAL BANK
In Ridley v. Metropolitan Federal Bank,4 3 7 Geraldine Ridley, the
divorced former-spouse of the decedent, Donald Ridley, appealed the
430. Id.
431. Id. (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE 75-02-04.1-07(l)(b), which allows a court to impute income to
a self-employed obligor if that obligor's income is significantly less than the prevailing amount earned
in the community by a person with similar work history and occupational qualifications).
432. Id. (stating that under N.D. ADMIN. CODE 75-02-04.1-07(l)(b), Jody failed to present






437. 544 N.W.2d 867 (N.D. 1996).
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district court's award of the proceeds of two IRA accounts and a bank
account to Donald's estate.4 38 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the district court, concluding that the divorce decree, which
gave the bank accounts and the IRAs to Donald "free of any interest"
of Geraldine, nullified the earlier contractual designations of survivor-
ship rights to Geraldine.4 39
Donald and Geraldine were married in March of 1984.440 Prior to
their marriage, Donald opened two IRA accounts at Metropolitan Federal
Bank. 441 After Donald and Geraldine married, Donald designated
Geraldine as the beneficiary on both of the IRA accounts. 442 Addition-
ally, Donald and Geraldine opened a joint bank account at First Bank in
Langdon. 443 In October of 1990, Donald and Geraldine divorced. 444
One clause of the divorce decree provided that "each party shall own
free of any interest of the other all savings accounts, checking accounts
and every other asset of every nature, kind and description either owned
by them prior to the marriage or that is now in the respective
individual's name." 445
As a result of the decreed division of property, Donald received the
IRA accounts and the joint bank account, however, Donald never
changed the beneficiary designations on any of the accounts. 446 When
Donald died in August of 1994, his estate sought the proceeds of all
three accounts. 447 Although First Bank of Langdon turned over the
proceeds of the joint bank account, Metropolitan Federal Bank refused
to do the same until a determination was made as to who had the rights
to the accounts. 4 8 After Donald's estate petitioned the district court to
determine the rights to the accounts, Geraldine counterclaimed for the
proceeds of the joint bank account and the IRA accounts as the surviving
beneficiary. 449 The district court, relying on the clause in the divorce
decree stating that the party receiving the accounts would receive them
"free of any interest of the other," concluded that "any interest"
included Geraldine's inchoate survivorship interest in all three accounts,
and thus awarded all of the accounts to Donald's estate. 450
438. Ridley v. Metropolitan Fed. Bank, 544 N.W.2d 867, 868 (N.D. 1996).
439. Id.
440. Id. at 867.
441. Id.
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Geraldine appealed the district court's decision claiming that
because Donald did not remove her as the designated beneficiary on the
accounts during his lifetime, she succeeded to those accounts upon his
death. 451 In finding that the divorce decree nullified Geraldine's
survivorship rights to the accounts, the North Dakota Supreme Court
looked to prior case law and reiterated its analysis of nonprobate trans-
fers on death. 452 The Court looked to Nunn v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society453 and concluded that a "beneficiary's rights in an insurance
policy are not affected by a divorce between the beneficiary and insured,
but . . . a beneficiary may still contract away an interest in the policy
through a settlement agreement even if the beneficiary is not formally
changed." 454  Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's
finding that Geraldine had contracted away her right of survivorship to
the accounts when she entered into the stipulation for division of
property in the divorce decree. 455
INFANTS--CRIMES
IN RE A.E.
In In re A.E.,456 A.E. and five other juveniles were arrested after the
murder of Cheryl Tendeland in West Fargo, North Dakota on November
15, 1995.457 A petition was filed in Cass County Juvenile Court alleging
that A.E. was a delinquent child because he conspired to commit armed
robbery in connection with the Tendeland incident. 458 The State filed a
motion to transfer jurisdiction to Cass County District Court and after a
hearing, the court granted the motion.459
A.E. appealed two issues.460 First, A.E. argued that the State did not
meet its burden of persuasion on the question of whether there existed
reasonable grounds to believe he conspired to commit armed robbery. 461
Second, A.E. argued that the State failed to meet its burden of persua-
sion in proving that he was not amenable to treatment as a juvenile. 462
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. 272 N.W.2d 780 (N.D. 1978).
454. Ridley, 544 N.W.2d at 868 (citing Nunn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 272 N.W,2d
780 (N.D. 1989)). The supreme court also noted that in analyzing cases dealing with nonprobate
transfers on death, contract law usually controls the survivorship rights of a designee of an interest in
accounts. Id. at 869.
455. Id. at 869.
456. 559 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1997).
457. In re A.E., 559 N.W.2d 215, 216 (N.D. 1997).
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On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the juvenile
court's application of North Dakota's transfer statute which contains
three sections.463 Section one authorizes, for prosecution purposes, the
transfer of certain offenses from juvenile court to the district court be-
fore hearing the case, provided that reasonable grounds exist to believe
that the child committed the act or is not amenable to treatment or
rehabilitation. 464 Section two465 shifts the burden of persuasion in
proving amenability to treatment or rehabilitation from the state to the
463. Id. at 216-19 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 1997)).
464. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1)(c). The statute authorizes the transfer of some offenses
from juvenile court to the district court for prosecution, providing in part:
1. After a petition has been filed alleging delinquency based on conduct which is
designated a crime or public offense ... the court before hearing the petition on its
merits shall transfer the offense for prosecution to the appropriate court having
jurisdiction of the offense if:
c. (1) The child was fourteen or more years of age at the time of the alleged conduct;
(2) A hearing on whether the transfer should be made is held in conformity with
sections 27-20-24, 27-20-26, and 27-20-27;
(3) Notice in writing of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing is given to the
child and the child's parents, guardian, or other custodian at least three days
before the hearing; and
(4) The court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that:
(a) The child committed the delinquent act alleged;
(b) The child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile
through available programs;
(c) The child is not treatable in an institution for the mentally retarded or
mentally ill;
(d) The interests of the community require that the child be placed under
legal restraint or discipline; and
(e) If the child is fourteen or fifteen years old, the child committed a
delinquent act involving the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm.
Id.
465. A.E., 559 N.W.2d at 217. In 1995, the North Dakota Legislature enacted amendments to
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34. Id. (citing 1995 N.D. Laws ch. 124, sec. 15). One of the 1995
amendments to the transfer statute was codified as N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(2), which provides:
(2) The burden of proving reasonable grounds to believe that a child is amenable to
treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available programs is on the child in
those cases in which the alleged delinquent act involves the offense of manslaughter,
aggravated assault, robbery, arson involving an inhabited structure, or escape involving
the use of a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon or in those cases
where the alleged delinquent act involves an offense which if committed by an adult
would be a felony and the child has two or more previous delinquency adjudications for
offenses which would be a felony if committed by an adult.
Id. at 217-18 (citing § 27-20-34(2)).
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child, while section three sets forth the factors a court must consider in
determining a child's amenability to treatment.466
In addressing the first issue, the court found the State met its burden
of persuasion and established reasonable grounds to believe A.E. com-
mitted the delinquent act of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. 467 At
the transfer hearing, the trial court heard testimony from a Fargo police
detective that A.E. was present in the vehicle when Cheryl Tendeland was
shot to death, was present the night before when his companions robbed
occupants of another car at gunpoint, and was present when the spoils
from that robbery were divided.468 The court agreed with the trial
court's conclusion that based on the evidence, the State had reasonable
grounds to believe that A.E. committed the offense of conspiracy to
commit armed robbery. 469
In addressing the second issue, the supreme court prefaced its
holding by explaining that the transfer statute contained a codification
that effectively transferred the burden of persuasion from the State to the
child in issues of amenability to treatment or rehabilitation. 470 Conse-
quently, A.E. was required to prove that he could be rehabilitated. 471
A.E. relied only upon the North Dakota Youth Correction Center's
(NDYCC) report, the purpose of which was to determine A.E.'s amena-
bility to treatment. 472 The author of the report was unable to assert
"absolutely and categorically" that A.E. was not amenable to treatment
because he had not been involved in any "specific treatment programs
on a protracted basis." 473 The report also contained information that
could be construed as indicating potential for A.E.'s rehabilitation.4 74
Conversely, the State emphasized the report's overall conclusion
that A.E. was not amenable to treatment as juvenile.475 The State argued
that assessing individual components, instead of the whole report, did not
466. Id. at 218. The transfer statute states the factors that the court shall consider and make
findings on in determining a child's amenability to treatment and rehabilitation. Id. These factors
include:
[A]ge, mental capacity, maturity, degree of criminal sophistication exhibited, previous
record, success or failure of previous attempts to rehabilitate, whether the juvenile can
be rehabilitated prior to expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction, any psychological,
probation, or institutional reports, the nature and circumstances of the acts for which the
transfer is sought, the prospect for adequate protection of the public, and any other
relevant factors.
Id. (citing § 27-20-34(3)).
467. Id. at 217.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. ld. at 218.
471. Id.
472. Id.
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provide an accurate picture of A.E.'s amenability to treatment. 476 The
court affirmed the juvenile court finding that A.E. did not meet his
burden of persuasion by showing reasonable grounds to believe that he
was amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile through
available programs.4 77
The North Dakota Supreme Court expressed concern over instances
in which the State and the child rely on the same report in treatment
amenability cases. 478 The court stated that a child needs an expert wit-
ness who "will study, evaluate, and visit with the child enough" to offer
answers to important questions. 479 Moreover, the child's expert witness
should be knowledgeable of statutory requirements and the critical
elements of the opinion he or she must give in order for the child to
prevail. 480 The court further noted that in a different case, one in which
other evidence was offered, the NDYCC report would not necessarily be
controlling. 48 1
Justice Sandstrom concurred, stating that he agreed with the majori-
ty but noted that there can be reasonable grounds, or probable cause, to
believe something both is and is not the case.4 82 Consequently, when the
other factors are met, if there is substantial evidence both of amenability
to treatment and of non-amenability to treatment, the juvenile is to be
bound over.483 Justice Meschke also concurred, stating that the language
in sections one and two of the transfer statute "hopelessly and sense-
lessly conflict" concerning who must prove or disprove a juvenile's
amenability to treatment. 484
MINES AND MINERALS
CONTINENTAL RESOURCES, INC. V. FARRAR OIL Co.
In Continental Resources, Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 485 Continental
Resources, Inc. (Continental), an oil and gas lease holder, brought an
action against Farrar Oil Co. (Farrar), a lease owner in the same spacing
unit, seeking a declaratory judgment that Continental's proposed
476. Id.
477. Id. at 220.
478. Id.
479. Id. (citing In re M.D.N., 493 N.W.2d 680, 689 (N.D. 1992) (Levine, J., concurring)).
480. Id. at 220 (citing M.D.N., 493 N.W.2d at 689).
481. Id.
482. Id. (citing In re T.M., 512 N.W.2d 441, 443 (N.D. 1994) (quoting M.D.N., 493 N.W.2d at
689)).
483. Id.
484. Id. at 220-221.
485. 559 N.W.2d 841 (N.D. 1997).
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horizontal well would not be considered a subsurface trespass 486 of
Farrar's leasehold. 487 Farrar counterclaimed for a declaration that the
proposed horizontal well would constitute a trespass of its leasehold. 488
The district court entered summary judgment declaring that Continen-
tal's drilling of a horizontal well in a force-pooled spacing unit would
not be a trespass; Farrar appealed.4 89 The North Dakota Supreme Court
held that Continental, by virtue of being authorized by the state Industri-
al Commission's forced pooling order, would not be committing a sub-
surface trespass by drilling a horizontal well through Farrar's subsurface
formation. 490
Continental held oil and gas leases on the northwest and southeast
quarters of Section 17, Township 131 North, Range 103 West, Bowman
County, North Dakota. 491 Farrar held oil and gas leases on the northeast
and southwest quarters of the same section.4 92 Section 17 lies within
zone II of the Cedar Hills-Red River "B" oil field.493 In September of
1995, the state Industrial Commission assigned temporary spacing in
zone II for a maximum of two horizontal wells 494 for each 640 acre
unit.495 Thereafter, Continental proposed to Farrar that a horizontal well
be drilled, beginning at a surface location in Continental's northwest
quarter, and crossing under the southwest quarter of Farrar's
leasehold. 496 Farrar turned down the proposal.4 97
Continental petitioned the Industrial Commission to force the pool-
ing of all interests relative to the proposed well in section 17,498 and in
486. Continental Resources, Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 559 N.W.2d 841, 841 (N.D. 1997). A subsur-
face trespass may be defined as the bottoming of a well on another's land without permission. Id. at
844 (citing HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES I. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS (8th ed.
1991)). For oil and gas purposes, a subsurface trespass occurs when someone intentionally or uninten-
tionally drills a "slant" or directional well. Id. Subsurface trespass is as wrongful as surface trespass,
thus the same liability attaches. Id.
487. Id. at 842-44.
488. Id. at 842.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 846.
491. Id. at 842.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id. In some instances, North Dakota regulations define a horizontal well as "a well with a
horizontal displacement of the well bore drilled at an angle of at least eighty degrees within the
productive formation of at least three hundred feet [91.44 meters]." Id. at 843 n. I (citing N.D. ADMIN.
CODE § 43-02-11-01(2)). N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-18 fixes well locations in spacing units "[in
the absence of an order by the commission setting spacing units for a pool." Id.
495. Id. at 842.
496. Id. at 842-43.
497. Id. at 843.
498. Id.
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October of 1995, the Commission so ordered. 499 In spite of the forced
pooling order, Farrar notified Continental that it would treat any drilling
under its leasehold as an illegal subsurface trespass.500 Continental sued
Farrar for a declaratory judgment stating that drilling the proposed well
would not constitute a subsurface trespass of Farrar's leasehold.S01
Farrar counterclaimed for a declaration stating that the horizontal well
would trespass its leasehold. 50 2 Continental moved for summary
judgment, and both Continental and Farrar agreed that there were no
contested material facts. 503
The trial court had concluded that the Industrial Commission's
forced pooling order properly exercised the state's police power and
superseded the property law of trespass.504 As long as Continental com-
plied with the Commission's rules and regulations in drilling the well, the
forced pooling order would preclude any claim by Farrar.505 The North
Dakota Supreme Court agreed. 506
The supreme court framed the issue as whether or not state police
powers might be exercised "by the Commission in enforcement of the
North Dakota Oil and Gas Conservation Act to the extent necessary to
supersede the private property law relating to trespass." 507 The court
noted that property rights are protected by the North Dakota Consti-
tution. 508 Further, the court explained that in exercising its police
powers, the state is not limited to matters relating strictly to public health,
morals, and keeping the peace, but may intervene whenever public
interests demand it.509 Additionally, the court stated that the legislature
has great discretion in determining what the interests of the public
require and what steps are necessary to protect such interests. 510
The court further explained that state police powers are properly
used when the Industrial Commission orders spacing or compels
499. Id. The pooling order directed, effective on the date of first operations, the operator of a
well in section 17 to conduct its operations to protect correlative rights; directed the operator to share
with all interest owners, without unnecessary expense, their just, equitable, and proportionate share of
production; directed each working interest owner to reimburse the operator for a proportionate share
of reasonable actual costs of the well, plus a reasonable charge for supervision; and authorized the
operator, if it carried a nonparticipating lessee's share of costs, to recover a risk penalty from the
nonparticipating lessee. Id. The order reserved power to the Industrial Commission to determine
proper costs in the event of any dispute. Id.








508. Id. at 845 (citing N.D. CONST., art. I, §§ 1, 12, & 16).
509. Id. (citing State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 919 (N.D. 1943)).
510. Id. at 846 (citing Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d at 919).
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pooling, 511 and that in the present case, the police powers exercised by
the Commission superseded Farrar's right to use its oil and gas
properties as it wished.512 Because force-pooled oil and gas operations
are the proper "conduct of such operations upon each separately owned
tract in the drilling unit by the several owners thereof,"513 authorized
operations are not affected by the property law of trespass, and property
law is superseded.514 Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's
declaratory judgment stating that because Continental is authorized by
the Industrial Commission's forced pooling order, it will not trespass
upon Farrar's property rights by drilling the authorized horizontal well
through Farrar's subsurface formation.515
MINES AND MINERALS-LEASES
RIDL v. EP OPERATING LTD. PARTNERSHIP
In Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd. Partnership,516 the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision upholding a 1973
oil and gas lease and dissolving a 1995 satisfaction of an oil and gas
lease which was recorded by the Ridls with the Register of Deeds. In
March of 1969, the Ridls gave an exclusive oil and gas lease on their
land to EP for a term of five years and as long as oil or gas was
produced therefrom, or as long as the lessee in good faith conducted
drilling operations. 517 In 1973, some of the Ridls' land was included in
the Dickinson Sand Unit. 518 Later that same year, the Ridls executed an
511. Id (citing Slawson v. North Dakota Indus. Comm'n, 339 N.W.2d 772, 774 (N.D. 1983) (stat-
ing that the Commission is authorized to treat an unleased mineral interest as cost-free for one-eighth
when force pooling); Hystad v. Industrial Comm'n, 389 N.W.2d 590, 594 (N.D. 1986) ("[The] Com-
mission has the authority to divide a pool into geographic areas (i.e. zone a pool) for non-uniform spac-
ing units when necessary to prevent waste, avoid drilling unnecessary wells, or to protect correlative
rights"); Texaco Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 448 N.W.2d 621, 624 (N.D. 1989) ("Giving effect to both
the spacing and pooling provisions of ch. 38-08, the Commission may, within the guidelines of Section
38-08-08, N.D.C.C., issue compulsory pooling orders retroactive to the date of first operations")).
512. Id. at 846.
513. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08(1) (1991)).
514. Id. (citing Union Pac. Resources Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 882 P.2d 212 (Wyo. 1994) (finding an
Oil and Gas Conservation Commission order enlarging a drilling unit superseded the terms of an
operating agreement setting the working interest percentages of ownership in original unit); Nunez v.
Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So.2d 955, 964 (La. 1986) ("[Wlhen the Commissioner of Conservation
has declared that landowners share a common interest in a reservoir of natural resources beneath
their adjacent tracts, such common interest does not permit one participant to rely on a concept of
individual ownership to thwart the common right to the resource as well as the important state interest
in developing its resources fully and efficiently"); Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Rein, 534 P.2d 1277,
1279 (Okla. 1974) ("To hold otherwise would frustrate the intent of the [Conservation] Act because
the owner desiring to drill would not be entitled to do so unless he held a lease covering the well
location designated by the Commission")).
515. Id.
516. 553 N.W.2d 784 (N.D. 1996).
517. Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd. Partnership, 553 N.W.2d 784, 786 (N.D. 1996).
518. Id.
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exclusive oil and gas lease for the land covered by the 1969 lease for a
term of five years, and"as long thereafter as oil, gas, distillate ...is
produced hereunder, or any operation is conducted, any payment is
made, or any condition exists, which as hereinafter provided continues
this lease in force." 519  Both leases provided for unitization and
provided that unitized production would constitute production under the
lease. 520
On April 15, 1981, the Ridls ratified the 1973 lease and on May 12,
1981, EP's predecessor began drilling a well and completed it as a dry
well on June 2, 1981.521 On May 25, 1995, relying on section 47-16-36
of the North Dakota Century Code, the Ridls sent EP a letter requesting
release of the 1973 lease, except for the land in the Dickinson Unit, a
partial release for EP to sign, and a notice of termination of the 1973
lease. 522 The notice stated the lease was forfeited and void unless EP
notified the Register of Deeds within twenty days that the lease had not
been forfeited and also demanded that EP execute and record the
surrender of the lease. 523 The letter was delivered to EP on May 31,
1995, and received by EP's legal department on June 15, 1995.524 On
June 15, 1995, the Ridls recorded the notice of termination of the 1973
lease and a Satisfaction of Oil and Gas Lease with the Register of Deeds,
stating that the 1973 lease, except for the land included in the Dickinson
Unit, was forfeited. 525 On June 16, 1995, EP sent letters to the Register
of Deeds and the Ridls' attorney stating the lease was in full force and
effect and on July 5, 1995, recorded a notice of oil and gas lease with the
Register of Deeds, declaring the 1973 lease had been and still was in full
force and effect as to all of the acreage covered by the lease. 526 On
August 8, 1995, the Ridls sued EP for cancellation of the 1973 lease,
claiming EP did not timely respond to the notice of termination and EP
answered and counterclaimed. 527 Both parties filed motions for sum-
mary judgment and the trial court granted summary judgment to EP.528
The Ridls appealed. 529
The Ridls argued that EP forfeited any interest it had in the 1973











529. Id. at 787.
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within the statutory requirement of twenty days.5 30 The North Dakota
Supreme Court responded to this claim by stating that the only conse-
quence for a lessee's failure to notify the Register of Deeds within
twenty days of notice of termination is the loss of record evidence. 53 1
The court stated further that the statute provides that if the owner of the
lease refuses to execute a release, the owner of the land may sue in court
to obtain a release. 532 The court, in concluding that EP did not lose its
interest in the 1973 lease when it failed to timely respond to the notice of
termination, said that if the statute was interpreted as the Ridls argued, it
would make the leased land owner's right to "sue for a release,
superfluous." 533 The court also stated that the Ridls' reliance on Taurus
Corp. v. Roman Yourk Equity Pure Trust 534 was misplaced. 535 The court,
in light of their reading of the language of section 47-16-36 and
47-16-37 of the North Dakota Century Code and in reconsideration of
Taurus, declined to extend the ruling in Taurus to cases involving
alleged breach of implied covenants. 536
The Ridls contended on appeal that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment to EP on the grounds that the Ridls did not
make a proper demand for performance of the implied covenant of
reasonable development. 537  The court concluded that it could not
reasonably be inferred from the letter or the complaint that a demand
had been made that EP further develop the leasehold. 538 Rather, stated
the court, the letter and the complaint "implicitly warned against further
development." Furthermore, the court stated that the Ridls' demands
did not comply with a clause in the 1973 lease dealing with the lessee's
failure to comply with its obligations. 539
The Ridls final contention, that the trial court erred in concluding
that the 1973 lease did not require production in paying quantities, was
not addressed by the North Dakota Supreme Court. 540 The transcript of
530. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36 (1995)).
531. Id. The court quoted North Dakota Century Code section 47-16-36, which provides in part:
If the lessee, his successors or assigns, shall not notify the register of deeds, as above
provided, then the register of deeds shall record said satisfaction of lease and thereafter
the record of the said lease shall not be notice to the public of the existence of said lease
or of any interest therein, or rights thereunder, and said record shall not be received in
evidence in any court of the state on behalf of the lessee, his successors or assigns,
against the lessor, his successors or assigns.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36 (Supp. 1997).
532. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-37).
533. Id.
534. 264 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1978).
535. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787.
536. Id. at 788 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-16-36, -37).
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id. at 789.
540. Id.
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the trial court hearing shows that this claim was going to be asserted only
if summary judgment was not granted to either of the parties, and since
summary judgment was granted to EP, the court concluded that the
claim was effectively withdrawn by the Ridls.541 Because the court was
upholding the trial court's granting of summary judgment, the issue was
of no further significance in the case.542
Justice Meschke dissented, disagreeing with the majority's refusal to
follow Taurus and the majority's interpretation of section 47-16-36 of
the North Dakota Century Code. 543 The effect of the majority's deci-
sion, Justice Meschke stated, was to deprive oil and gas lessors of an
important tool to encourage development, forcing lessor's to allow
lessees to "warehouse" oil resources. 544 He stated that section 47-16-36
was enacted to provide an affordable and prompt method for landowners
to clear the cloud of title to minerals in a lease that the landowner claims
has been forfeited without going to court, and that the statute applies to
leases where the forfeiture is disputed, as well as those where the lease has
been forfeited on its face. 545 Furthermore, stated Justice Meschke, sec-
tion 47-16-36 would serve little purpose if the lessor was required to
seek a judicial determination that the lease was terminated before using
the tools the statute provides. 546 Justice Meschke expressed his disap-
proval of the majority's "gutting" of section 47-16-36 stating that the
statute is left "meaningless and worthless" as a result of the majority's
interpretation. 547 Finally, Justice Meschke said there was no basis for the
majority to exclude from the operation of section 47-16-36 forfeitures
resulting from a violation of an implied covenant. 548 He stated that the
statute makes no such distinction and that "courts are not authorized to
legislate by reading exceptions into a statute that are not there."549
TORTS-DEFAMATION
VANOVER V. KANSAS CITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
In Vanover v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 550 Edward D. Vanover
appealed from a district court amended judgment, claiming the trial
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 789-92 (citing N.D. C ENr. CODE § 47-16-36; Taurus Corp. v. Roman Yourk Equity
Pure Trust, 204 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1978)).
544. Id. at 789.
545. Id. at 791.
546. Id. at 790 (citing Taurus, 264 N.W2 at 688).
547. Id. at 790-92.
548. Id. at 791.
549. Id.
550. 533 N.W.2d 192 (N.D. 1996).
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court erred in vacating the jury verdict from the first trial and ordering a
new trial. 551 Kansas City Life Insurance Company (Kansas City) cross-
appealed from the trial court's denial of its motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 552 The North Dakota Supreme Court, modifying
the judgment and affirming the district court, found the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in vacating the first verdict and ordering a new
trial. 553
In 1983, Vanover was terminated from his position as a general
agent for Kansas City and Armour Life Insurance, 554 after a dispute
arose over unpaid commissions. 555 Thereafter, Vanover went to work for
Globe Life and Accident Insurance Company (Globe) and American
Health and Life Insurance Company (American). 556 Vanover sued
Armour for the unpaid commissions and Kansas City for wrongful termi-
nation. 557 After Vanover filed suit, Kansas City sent letters to all Kansas
City general agents, to American, and to Globe, stating Vanover had
been terminated "for cause." 558 After receiving the letters, Globe and
American terminated Vanover. 559 Consequently, Vanover sued Kansas
City for defamation claiming Kansas City had made unprivileged and
false statements that Vanover had been terminated "for cause."
560
Kansas City moved for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted. 56 1 Vanover appealed from the district court's judgment, and
the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing the
district court to make findings as to whether the statements that Vanover
was terminated "for cause" could be construed as defamatory.
562
On remand, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Vanover, finding
he had been libeled and slandered and awarded him damages of
$1,000,250.563 Kansas City moved for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or a new trial. 564 The trial court granted a motion for a new trial
on grounds it had erred in using a verdict form that did not distinguish
the jury's findings of fact as to each letter. 565 At the new trial, the jury
found all three letters defamatory and awarded Vanover damages of
551. Vanover v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 553 N.W.2d 192, 195 (N.D. 1996).
552. Id. at 194.
553. Id. at 195.
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$1,900,250.566 Kansas City moved to correct the judgment, and the trial
court amended the award of damages to $250.567 Vanover appealed and
Kansas City cross-appealed. 568
On appeal, Vanover argued the trial court erred in vacating the
jury's verdict from the first trial and ordering a new trial. 569 The su-
preme court will not reverse a trial court's decision to grant a new trial
unless the trial court acts unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably.
570
In granting a new trial, the trial court found that it had erred because it
did not use verdict forms which allowed the jury to make findings of fact
as to each letter. 571 Conversely, Vanover contended there was only one
publication to numerous recipients, and therefore only one finding of
damages was required. Vanover's argument, however, did not persuade
the supreme court, which found there were "three letters constituting
three publications to three different groups of people." 572 Thus, the
supreme court did not find the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering a new trial.573
In determining whether the trial court erred in amending the jury's
award of damages after the second trial, the supreme court views "the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine only
whether there is substantial evidence to support it."574 The supreme
court found there was substantial evidence that Kansas City's letters
damaged Vanover's reputation, and thus upheld the jury's award of
compensatory damages to Vanover.575
In its decision to uphold the jury's award of compensatory
damages, the supreme court reviewed the trial court's memorandum
opinion which amended the award. 576 The trial court ruled that in a defa-
mation action, "there must be special damages before there can be
compensatory damages before there can be exemplary damages."
577
Further, the trial court ruled that because the jury only found special
damages for the letter which was sent to American, all of the other
damages failed because in order to get to compensatory and exemplary
damages, there must be a finding of special damages. 578 Accordingly,
566. See Vanover, 553 N.W.2d at 194-95.
567. Id. at 195.
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. Id. (citing to Delzer v. United Bank, 527 N.W.2d 650 (N.D. 1995); Okken v. Okken, 325
N.W.2d 264 (N.D. 1982)).
571. Vanover. 553 N.W.2d at 195.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 197.
575. Id.
576. Id. at 195-96.
577. Vanover, 553 N.W.2d at 195-96.
578. Id.
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the supreme court found the requirement of proving special damages in
a libel action is a minority rule and instead, the trend is to follow the
Restatement Second of Torts § 569, which allows recovery in libel
actions without proof of special damages. 579 Thus, the supreme court
concluded it is inappropriate to require proof of special damages in libel
actions, but proof of any compensatory or actual damages will support
an award of exemplary damages. 580
Finally, the supreme court held that the punitive damage award was
not excessive. 581 An award for punitive damages is excessive if it is "so
great that it indicates passion or prejudice on the part of the jury." 582
The rational for the supreme court's holding was in its review of the
record, there was no ground on which to find the verdict excessive. 583
TORTS-LIABILITY
BOUCHARD V. JOHNSON
In Bouchard v. Johnson,5 84 the Federal District Court for the
District of North Dakota certified two questions to the North Dakota
Supreme Court: 1) whether the North Dakota Skiing Responsibility
Act585 (Skiing Act) provides an exclusive list of duties for ski area
operators, barring negligence actions by skiers; and 2) whether the
Skiing Act violates the equal protection or due process clauses of the
United States or North Dakota Constitutions, or the special laws or open
courts clauses of the North Dakota Constitution.586
In 1994, a Canadian citizen was fatally injured at a Walhalla, North
Dakota, ski resort when she struck a tree while skiing down a run.587
Leda Bouchard, acting as trustee for the heirs of the skier, filed a wrong-
ful death suit against the ski resort and its owner claiming negligence. 588
The ski resort denied negligence, claiming they fully complied with their
duties under the Skiing Act and were therefore insulated from
liability. 589 The ski resort moved for summary judgment and the federal
district court certified the above questions. 590
579. Id. at 197.
580. Id.
581. Vanaover, 553 N.W.2d at 199.
582. Id. (citing Dewey v. Lutz, 462 N.W.2d 435, 4434 (N.D. 1990)).
583. Id.
584. 555 N.W.2d 81 (N.D. 1996).
585. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 53-09 (1995).
586. Bouchard v. Johnson, 555 N.W.2d 81, 82 (N.D. 1996).
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As to the first question, whether the list of duties provided for ski
resort operators in the Skiing Act is exclusive, the North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that the list was not exclusive. 59 1 The court
stated that if the language of the statute is unambiguous, the court will
follow it; but the court will not interpret the statute as though language
that is not contained in the statute should have been added, nor will the
court construe a statute to reach an absurd result. 592 The court stated
that the statute does not, on its face, indicate whether the list of duties is
exclusive.593 There is no evidence in the legislative history illustrating an
intent to make the list exclusive, and there is no mention of exclusivity of
the list in the legislative committee hearings. 594 The court found that
there were comments in the legislative history describing the statute as a
method to limit ski resort operators' liability, but no comments indicat-
ing the Skiing Act is to be a complete bar to recovery. 595 The court
concluded that the legislature intended the statute to protect ski resort
operators from lawsuits by patrons injured as a result of risks inherent in
the sport of skiing, but did not intend for the statute to immunize
operators from all negligence claims. 596
The court, citing the Utah Supreme Court, 597 discussed two types of
inherent risks. 598 The first consists of risks such as steep grades, powder,
and mogul runs which skiers wish to encounter as part of the total skiing
experience. 599 The second type of inherent risks are hazards that no one
wishes to encounter, but cannot be eliminated by reasonable care on the
part of the ski resort, such as sudden changes in weather and snow
conditions. 600 The court stated that ski resort operators cannot alleviate
these inherent risks, and thus are not liable for injuries caused by such
risks. 601 However, stated the court, that does not mean that ski operators
are fully insulated from liability. 602 If for example, there is a defective
design in a ski run as a result of the operators negligence, creating a risk
that is not inherent in the sport, the operator should be held liable. 603
Bouchard argued that the Skiing Act conflicts with provisions of the
comparative fault statute in that it "carves out an exception from the
general comparative fault provision, despite the fact that the comparative





596. Id. at 85.
597. See Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Utah 1991).
598. Bouchard, 555 N.W.2d at 85.
599. Id.
600. Id.
601. Id. (quoting Clover, 808 P.2d at 1047).
602. Id.
603. Id. at 85-6.
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fault statute is on its face applicable to all tort victims." 604 The compar-
ative fault statute provides that a person is barred from recovery for
injury caused by an inherent risk in the sport of skiing and where it has
been established that the person knowingly exposed himself or herself to
the potential hazards of the sport.605 The court rejected Bouchard's
argument, stating that the Skiing Act does not completely bar recovery
but rather defines ski resort operator's duties, and that a skier is barred
from recovery, only if the injury was caused by an inherent risk in
skiing. 606 Thus, concluded the court, the two statutes are consistent with
one another, rather than in conflict.607
The court then discussed whether the Skiing Act violates the equal
protection guarantees of the North Dakota Constitution. 608 The court
said that because the right to recover for personal injury is an important
substantive interest, intermediate scrutiny is required. 609 Therefore, the
court had to determine whether there was a "close correspondence
between statutory classification and legislative goals." 6 10 Bouchard
argued that the Skiing Act created an impermissible classification by
favoring ski resort operators and giving them protection from liability
not afforded other landowners. 611 The court, not persuaded by this argu-
ment, stated that statutes may create reasonable classifications and that
the classification created in the Skiing Act was reasonable. 612 The
legislative goal was only to limit liability of ski resort operators from
risks inherent in the sport of skiing, not eliminate it altogether. 613 If the
limitations were not in place, ski resorts would be subject to unlimited
exposure to liability, thus the classification merely helps to protect
resorts from complete liability. 6 14 Therefore, concluded the court, the
classification has a close correspondence to the legislative intent and
does not violate equal protection.615
The court then discussed whether the Skiing Act violates the special
law provision of the North Dakota Constitution and concluded that it
does not. 616 The special law provision of the Constitution provides in
part that "no local or special laws may be enacted." 6 17 The court stated
604. Id. at 86.
605. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-09-10 (1995)).
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. Id. at 87.
609. Id.
610. Id. (citations omitted).
611. Id.





617. ld. (quoting N.D. CONST. art IV, § 13).
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that "[a] special law only applies to particular persons or things of a
class, while a general law applies to all person[s] and things of a class"
and that if the statute treats all persons equally, the statute is general. 6 18
In the court's view, the Skiing Act treats all persons operating ski resorts
within the state equally, and therefore the court concluded that the
Skiing Act is a general law.6 19
Lastly, the court addressed the question whether the Skiing Act
violates the right of access to the courts. 620 The court noted that the
right of access is not absolute. 621 The court stated further that the Skiing
Act is not an absolute bar and thus does not deny access to the courts. 622
TRADE REGULATION-TRADE NAMES AND TRADEMARKS
KAT VIDEO PRODUCTIONS, INC. v. KKCT-FM RADIO
In KAT Video Productions, Inc. v. KKCT-FM Radio,623 a video
producer using the name "KAT Productions" and a lion logo brought a
trademark infringement action against a radio station using the name
"Kat Country" and a tiger logo. 62 4 The district court entered summary
judgment in favor of the radio station and the video producer
appealed. 625 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the case was
unsuitable for summary judgment because there existed genuine issues
of material fact concerning the likelihood of confusion between the
parties' trademarks. 626
In 1989, Todd Muggerud founded KAT Productions, a video
production business. 627 Muggerud "conceived" the name "KAT," and
decided on a lion's head logo because he intended to distinguish his
business from other competitors. 628 In 1993, Kat Country, a country
music radio station and audio production company was founded and
began using the name "Kat" and a tiger's head logo in its adver-
tising. 629 Upon learning of Kat Country's advertising campaign, KAT
Productions registered its logo and name in accordance with state law. 630
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. Id. at 89 (quoting N.D. CONST. art I, § 9 (providing in part that "[a]ll courts shall be open,
and every man for any injury done... shall have remedy by due process of law")).
621. Id.
622. Id.
623. 560 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1997).
624. KAT Video Prods., Inc. v. KKCT-FM Radio, 560 N.W.2d 203,206 (N.D. 1997).
625. Id.
626. Id. at 212.
627. Id. at 206.
628. Id.
629. Id.
630. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-22, 47-25 (1995)).
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In September of 1994, KAT Productions filed suit against Kat
Country for trademark and trade name infringement. 6 3 1 In July of
1995, KAT Productions moved for a temporary injunction enjoining Kat
Country from using the "Kat" name and tiger logo. 6 32 In an affidavit
before the district court, Muggerud provided the names of several busi-
nesses and individuals who had confused the two businesses or mis-
takenly assumed they were affiliated.633 After a hearing on the motion
for the temporary injunction, the court requested an amended motion in
order to position the case for summary judgment. 634 In April of 1996,
the court's memorandum opinion stated that in determining whether the
likelihood of confusion exists between parties' trademarks and trade
names, a court must examine six key areas: strength of trademark or
trade names; similarities between marks; competitive proximity of pro-
duct; alleged infringer's intent to confuse the public; evidence of actual
confusion; and the degree of care reasonably expected of plaintiff's
potential customers. 635
Examining the strength of "KAT," the trial court found that
"KAT" was an arbitrary trademark, and thus enjoyed the greatest
amount of protection under state law.636 In its summary judgment
finding, the trial court found no infringement by Kat Country because
the trademarks were distinguishable, the companies did not directly
compete with each other, there was "no basis to suggest consumers"
were confused, and Kat Country did not intend to create the illusion that
their product was affiliated with KAT Productions. 637 KAT Productions
appealed. 638
The North Dakota Supreme Court explained that trademarks identi-
fy goods and services and trade names identify businesses, but the
standard of infringement is the same. 639 A trade name is a distinctive
word, name, symbol, or other designation that identifies and distin-
guishes one business from another.640 Moreover, to prevail on a claim
for trademark or trade name infringement, a party must show that it is
likely that ordinary and prudent purchasers of goods and services will be




634. Id. at 206-07.




638. Id. at 206.
639. Id. at 207 (citing American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926)).
640. Id. at 208 (citing American Steel, 269 U.S. at 380; N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-25-01 (1995)).
641. Id. (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1987)
(referring to federal infringement law under the Lanham Act)).
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First, the supreme court considered the strength or distinctiveness of
the trademark and trade name.642 The strength of a trademark or trade
name is measured by public opinion643 and falls into four broad
categories. 644 The court found the word "KAT" was an arbitrary or
fanciful mark because it did not describe the product in any way, and
therefore, was entitled to maximum protection under the law. 64 5
Second, the court addressed the similarities in the marks. 646 Stating
that the marks must be assessed "in light of the marketplace percep-
tion," 647 the court found that a reasonable consumer might not distin-
guish the marks without a side-by-side comparison. 648 Consequently,
the court found that because different factual inferences could be made
about similarities in the marks, the issue was not suitable for summary
judgment.649
Third, the court discussed the competitive proximity of the pro-
ducts.650 The court noted that "the touchstone of trademark infringe-
ment is confusion, not competition." 651 The court also stated that the
test is whether the services are related enough that prospective purchasers
are likely to believe the two services are associated. 652 While the supreme
court did not disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the two
companies' products were dissimilar and did not directly compete with
one another,653 the court found that the companies were members of the
same communications industry and shared some services. 654 Consequen-
tly, the court stated that whether the proximity in the products created a
perception of affiliation should be determined by a fact finder. 655
642. Id. at 209.
643. Id. (citing Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi Strauss, 841 F. Supp. 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
644. Id. (citing Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 939 (10th Cir. 1983)).
The four categories of terms and marks used in legal classifications are generic, descriptive,
suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful. Id. An arbitrary or fanciful designation is considered worthy of
the highest protection because it is identified exclusively with a particular good or service. Jordache,
841 F. Supp. at 515. A suggestive classification suggests something about the product, yet does not
describe it, and is thus protected by law. KAT Video, 560 N.W.2d at 209 (citing Woodroast Sys. v.
Restaurants Unlimited, 793 F. Supp. 906, 911 (D. Minn. 1992)). A descriptive designation describing
the nature of the goods, or a generic classification stating the type of goods, are weak marks and are
provided the least amount of protection under trademark and trade name law. Woodroast, 793 F.
Supp. at 911-12.
645. KAT Video, 560 N.W.2d. at 210.
646. Id.
647. Id. (citing Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Lab., 815 F.2d 500, 504 (8th Cir. 1987)).
648. Id.; see also Beer Nuts, 711 F.2d at 941 (stating the marks must be compared in light of what
occurs in the marketplace, where a consumer relies on his or her memory of the mark and not on an
exact sample).
649. KAT Video, 560 N.W.2d at 210.
650. Id.
651. Id. (citing Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1987)).
652. Id. (citing International Kennel Club v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1089 (7th Cir.
1988)).
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Fourth, the court addressed the alleged infringer's intent to confuse
the public. 656 Stating that the evidence did not indicate Kat Country's
intent to confuse consumers in the marketplace, the court then noted that
intent to confuse, alone, is not necessary for liability to attach. 657
Fifth, the court examined whether there existed evidence of actual
confusion between the marks in the marketplace. 658 The court stated
that the test for actual confusion looks to whether purchasers have
actually been confused by the purportedly similar marks. 659 The court
found that where Muggerud, through testimony and affidavit, submitted
a list of examples indicating instances in which consumers had confused
the two businesses, KAT Productions met its burden of showing a genu-
ine issue of material fact to overcome summary judgment.660 Conse-
quently, the court stated that the fact-finder must determine whether
sufficient evidence of actual confusion existed.661
Finally, in discussing the degree of care reasonably expected of the
plaintiff's potential customers, 662 the court explained that the more
money a consumer spends on a product, the greater care the consumer is
likely to exhibit in the marketplace, resulting in less confusion among
trade names and trademarks. 663 The supreme court agreed with the trial
court in finding that purchasers of the products of audio and video
services exercise a high degree of care, thus lessening the chance of any
trademark or trade name confusion. 664 However, the court stated that
material issues of fact existed concerning an ordinary purchaser's level
of sophistication and the amount of care used by that purchaser in the
beginning stages of selecting a producer. 665 Therefore, the court ruled
that there existed genuine issues of material fact which should be
resolved at trial, and summary judgment was not appropriate. 666
While two of the six issues were correctly decided as undisputed
based on submitted evidence, there existed contested issues of fact con-
cerning similarity of the marks, proximity of the products, evidence of
actual confusion, and the degree of care used by an ordinary
656. Id.
657. Id. (citing Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987)).
658. Id.
659. Id. (citing Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi Strauss, 841 F. Supp. 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
660. Id. at 211-12.
661. Id. at 212.
662. Id. (citing Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 941 (10th Cir. 1983)).
663. Id. (citing Woodroast Sys. v. Restaurants Unlimited, 793 F. Supp. 906, 911 (D. Minn. 1992)
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purchaser. 667 Thus, the supreme court reversed the dismissal of KAT
Production's complaint and remanded the case for trial. The court
further instructed the trial court to make findings on the remaining
issues of fact and to consider the matter in its entirety to determine
whether there is a likelihood of confusion between KAT Productions and
Kat Country's trade names and trademarks. 668
667. Id.; see, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1233 (7th Cir. 1993) (remanding
the case for trial because the district court inappropriately settled issues of material fact through
summary judgment).
668. KAT Video, 560 N.W.2d at 212.
